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Women's Earnings and Men's Childcare: Is There Ever a Motherhood Premium?

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Women's Earnings and Men's Childcare: Is There Ever a Motherhood Premium?

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Women's Earnings and Men's Childcare: Is There Ever a Motherhood Premium?

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A multitude of qualitative studies describe women's struggles to meet the expectations of intensive mothering with the complete commitment expected by employers (Hochschild 1989; Hochschild 1997; Hays 1998; Williams 2000; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Folbre 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between responsibility for reproductive labor and earnings. I ask if the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium are inherently gendered. Can women experience a gender-neutral breadwinner premium if they are the primary earner in the household? Similarly, do men experience a gender-neutral caregiver penalty when they contribute more to household reproductive labor than their peers?

I begin by using data from the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation to establish that husbands in female-breadwinner households have different childcare patterns than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. I then use female-breadwinner households as a test case in my analysis of the gender pay gap by looking for evidence of a gender-neutral breadwinner premium. Women did experience a breadwinner premium, but it was lower in magnitude than the premium experienced by men. The premium was gendered, but both men and women experienced a penalty for caregiving.

I conclude with analysis of data from an original survey experiment that investigates the relationship between anticipated spousal contribution to childcare and women's attitudes toward their careers. The survey experiment suggests that there are at least two significant components to an egalitarian distribution of labor: partners must both contribute similar amounts of work and they must also come to an agreement on how tasks should be completed and meet these shared standards in their contributions. These analyses allow me to enter the debate about the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The gender pay gap is hotly debated in both popular culture and sociological and economic research. Choice rhetoric positions the gender pay gap as the result of choices made by individuals and encourages women to find ways to "lean in" at work and specialize in more lucrative fields to compete with their male peers. Focusing on individual decisions and outcomes obscures the structural and systematic impediments women face in the workplace and in the home. Motherhood is a status characteristic—a quality that produces biased evaluations of an individual's performance when relevant, including lower salary recommendations, harsher standards for work commitment, and higher standards for perceived competency (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Because organizations assume women hold primary responsibility for reproductive labor, women are marginalized in the workplace and valued less by organizations than their "more committed" male peers. Women's perceived "strained commitment" is exacerbated once they have children because employers assume mothers will respond to the increased demands of parenthood by shifting their priorities away from the workplace and toward the needs of their children (Blair-Loy 2003). The opposite is true for men who employers assume become more attached to paid work after having children.

Women's primary responsibility for reproductive labor pushes them out of high-pressure, white-collar careers at a greater rate than men (Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Cha 2013). Williams (2000) calls this the "maternal wall" that prevents mothers with reproductive labor responsibilities from conforming to a 40-, 50-, or 60-plus hour per week schedule because they lack support at home. Middle-class women who attempt to balance their work and life commitments by reducing their work hours or using other

flexibility policies often find themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the "mommy track," or pushed out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Stone and Ackerly 2013). Budig and England (2001) demonstrate that the wage penalty experienced by mothers persists after controlling for human capital and demographic characteristics. Women's earnings decrease when they have children while men's earnings tend to increase when they have children because men benefit from women's unpaid labor at home (Budig and England 2001; Folbre 2001; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2010). These effects are called the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium.

In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between responsibility for reproductive labor and earnings. Specifically, I am interested in how men's contributions to reproductive labor in the home impact the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium experienced by men and women, respectively (Figure 1.1). I ask if the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium are inherently gendered. Can women experience a gender-neutral breadwinner premium if they are the primary earner in the household? Similarly, do men experience a gender-neutral caregiver penalty when they contribute more to household reproductive labor than their peers? I build on the body of research describing the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium by investigating female-breadwinner households as a test case for finding evidence of a gender-neutral breadwinner-premium and caregiver penalty.

I present three analyses in this dissertation that address different aspects of the relationship between men's contributions to childcare and men's and women's earnings. Two of the analyses use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (2008 SIPP), a nationally representative, longitudinal, household-level survey. The first wave took place in 2008 and respondents were surveyed every four months until 2013, yielding

a total of five years and four months of data. Researchers selected an initial sample of households for the first wave and interviewed all members of the household. For subsequent waves, researchers re-interviewed all household members including new residents. If a respondent moved out of the original household and into a new household, researchers followed that respondent. Some core questions were asked once each wave, but other questions asked participants to retrospectively report over smaller increments of time. For example, participants were asked to report their income for each of the previous months and to report their employment status for each of the previous weeks since the last survey.

The second data source was an original survey experiment developed for this dissertation to look at the relationship between husband's contributions to childcare and women's attitudes toward their careers. I recruited nearly 1,500 young (age 18-32), unmarried, childless women living in the United States using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. I focused on the experiences of women because their careers and career attitudes are the most affected by partner contributions to childcare. I asked participants to read a short vignette that described a future scenario where they were married and had children. I varied both the quality and amount of childcare that their partners contributed in the initial description. After reading this vignette, the women answered questions about their career attachment and career aspirations in the given scenario.

Chapter 2 uses data from the 2008 SIPP to look at husband's contributions to childcare in female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households (Figure 1.2). This is the first of the two chapters that use female-breadwinner households as a test case for observing a gender-neutral caregiver penalty and breadwinner premium. I set the foundation for the dissertation in this chapter by investigating and identifying differences between husband's contributions to childcare in the two groups of households. I focus on

two indicators of men's contributions to childcare: husband's reduced labor force participation to care for children and men's day-to-day involvement in their children's lives.

The third chapter continues using 2008 SIPP data and focuses specifically on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Figure 1.3). I tie together the themes from the previous chapter by looking at the relationship between husband's contributions to childcare and wives' and husbands' subsequent earnings. I investigate if the fatherhood premium and motherhood penalty are inherently gendered or if we can detect a gender-neutral breadwinner premium and caregiver penalty in cases where women act as the primary breadwinner for the household.

In the final substantive chapter, I continue work of the previous two chapters by looking at the relationship between anticipated partner support for childcare and women's career attitudes (Figure 1.4). I build on research that looks at couple's division of childcare by separating childcare into two components: the amount of childcare contributed and the quality of the childcare provided. Ethnographic and interview accounts of women's experiences with childcare describe both their frustrations when their partners refuse to share responsibility for childcare and their dissatisfaction with the quality of care that their partners provide (Hochschild 1989, Blair-Loy 2003, Stone 2007). Both of these factors increased women's responsibilities for reproductive labor and interfered with their ability to manage the competing demands of work and home. This experiment addresses a potential critique of the previous two chapters, namely that the relationships I observed between men's contributions to childcare, household structure, and individual earnings were the result of self-selection that I cannot account for. The experiment demonstrates that the link between men's contributions to childcare and women's careers persists after random assignment.

In these analyses, I first establish that husbands in female-breadwinner households have different childcare patterns than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. I then use female-breadwinner households as a test case in my analysis of the gender pay gap by looking for evidence that women can experience a breadwinner premium. I conclude by investigating the relationship between anticipated spousal contribution to childcare and women's attitudes toward their careers. These analyses allow me to enter the debate about the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium.



Figure 1.1: Conceptual model of variables and effects.



Figure1.2: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 2.



Figure 1.3: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 3.



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CHAPTER 2: FEMALE-BREADWINNER HOUSEHOLDS AND THE DIVISION OF REPRODUCTIVE LABOR

Introduction

Although women's labor force participation patterns increasingly mirror those of men, the gender pay gap persists in the form of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium. Women are more likely than men to make career sacrifices to care for children (Stone 2007; Cha 2013), and men benefit from women's time and work at home and are better able to advance their own careers and earning potential as a result. Married women also benefit from men's increased earning power, but upon divorce women often stop receiving financial returns for their investments (in the form of reproductive labor) in their husbands' careers.[1] Single mothers face an increased risk of experiencing poverty as a result (Williams 2000). Women's lost earning power also negatively affects their children because women are more likely to receive custody of children in a divorce or to care for them after the dissolution of a relationship (Williams 2000). Income transfers like child support and alimony fail to replace the full financial support of a father, and children are left to rely on the incomes of mothers who face discrimination in the paid labor force and whose earnings potential has been curtailed by responsibility for childcare and other household reproductive labor.

Family and work researchers have theorized extensively about the gender gap in pay and its relationship to reproductive labor (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; England, Hermsen, and Cotter 2000; Budig and England 2001; England, Budig, and

[1] Reproductive labor comprises the activities and relationships that maintain people both in daily life and from generation to generation (Glenn 1992). It encompasses daily chores like cooking and childcare as well as less structured activities like emotional work in maintaining family relationships and continuing cultural and ethnic traditions.

Folbre 2002; Gornick and Meyers 2003). Parts of the gap are explained by employer preferences and discrimination (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007), women's greater likelihood to take time off from their work or reduce their work hours in the paid labor force (Budig and England 2001), and women's lower levels of specialized human capital (Tam 1997). Underlying each of these explanations is women's perceived and/or actual greater responsibility for reproductive labor in the home.

I look at the case of female-breadwinner households, heterosexual couples where the wife earns a majority of the couple's combined income. The 2010 Census shows that the proportion of female-breadwinner households is increasing as the United States moves out of the economic recession (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). Mothers are the only or primary breadwinner in 40% of households with children under age 18, of which 15% are in married couples and 25% are single or cohabitating mothers. These households break the "traditionally" defined gender responsibilities within the home by having a female breadwinner. I investigate if the division of household reproductive labor in female-breadwinner households differs from the division of labor in non-female breadwinner households? I use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program participation to compare husband's likelihood of reducing labor force participation for childcare and husband's involvement in childcare in both categories of households.

Review of Literature

Hochschild (1989) described a stalled revolution in which women have increased their labor force attachment to increasingly mirror that of men, while men's contributions to reproductive labor have also grown but have fallen short of parity with women's share. There is a consensus in research on childcare time showing that, although men's

childcare time has increased in recent decades, women still spend significantly more time on housework and childcare tasks than men (Coltrane 2000; Williams 2000; Stone 2007; Maume 2011). Since the 1960s, women's time spent on housework (excluding childcare tasks) has been halved while men's has doubled (Bianchi et al 2000). During this same period, both women and men have increased their time spent on childcare (Bianchi 2000). Several studies suggest that not all of men's increased childcare time relieves the strain women experience in balancing work and family. Much of the increase in men's childcare time is on weekends, not on weekdays when women experience the greatest time constraints (Connelly and Kimmel 2010; Maume 2011). Furthermore, women are three times more likely than their male partners to provide emergency childcare during the workweek (Maume 2008). Men are also reluctant to use workplace flexibility policies designed to facilitate childcare for fear of suffering negative career consequences (Williams 2010; Coltrane et al. 2013). These trends suggest that, although men have increased their time spent with children, men are less willing to deviate from ideal worker norms to provide childcare.

Both men and women report preferring an egalitarian division of labor at home with both couples working for pay and splitting home maintenance and childcare tasks equally (Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). Men and women report wanting to spend less time working and more time caring for children or pursuing leisure activities (Williams 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Williams 2010). When men have control of their workweek schedules, their childcare time increases (Maume 2011). This suggests that men work to actualize their egalitarian preferences when they have fewer structural constraints on their time. These egalitarian preferences are hampered, however, by the demanding and inflexible requirements of employers. The United States lags behind other developed nations in flexibility and family-friendly workplace policies (Gornick and

Meyer 2003; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Pettit and Hook 2009; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2010; Milkman and Applebaum 2013). While policies facilitating work-life balance are treated more like rights in many European countries and mandated by the government, it is up to employers in the United States to offer flexibility policies as job perks.

High-status managerial and professional employees often have access to a variety of leave and flexibility policies. Stone (2007), Blair-Loy (2003), and Hochschild (1997) describe women's experiences with balancing work and family responsibilities. The companies that these men and women worked for had policies for parental leave, part-time or reduced scheduling, and compressed workweeks. Many of these companies were even recognized in industry and broader media as "family-friendly" and a good place for new parents to work. However, when the mothers tried to use these policies, they often faced one of two outcomes. The mother's request for flexibility was denied outright and their managers insisted that the mother come back to work after her parental leave with the same number of hours and the same rigid schedule as before having a baby. Alternatively, the manger accepted the mother's request for a schedule modification but the woman's status at work and the quality of her assignments suffered after she signaled her divided commitment. The fact that policies exist in company policy and in human resource manuals is far from a guarantee that employees have access to these policies or that these policies are compatible with workplace culture.

Employees recognize manager reluctance to grant leave and flexibility policies and perceive consequences for even asking about altering their work schedule. Professionals are more likely than workers in other occupations to overwork with schedules of 60 or more hours each week (Cha 2010). Women in these occupations seeking to work "part-time" after having children may only be requesting a 40 hour a

week schedule (Hochschild 1997; Stone 2007). Stone and Hernandez (2013) describe how professional women who moved to part-time positions and faced negative consequences at work internalized what Blair-Loy (2003) calls the work-devotion schema which demands complete dedication in the workplace. The "part-time" women accepted their decreased status at the office as what they deserved for scaling back their work hours, even when their reduced schedules still met or exceeded the standard for full-time work.

Men are especially reluctant to signal divided loyalties at work by requesting an adjusted schedule to take care of family needs (Williams 2010; Coltrane et al. 2013). Professional men perceive that their careers will be derailed because requesting schedule modification is a gender-incongruent activity—the men are not only signaling that they have responsibilities outside of their career, they are deviating from the masculine norm of the breadwinner and the career man. Williams (2010) reviews union arbitration cases that show how men in low-wage jobs who had crises of care were reluctant to reveal the reason for their need to take a day off or leave work early. These men were dedicated to their family care responsibilities and their union jobs would have allowed the absence or early leave time if they provided a reason, but the men jeopardized their jobs because they were unwilling to tell their supervisor that they needed to take care of a sick child or to go to the hospital to visit a dying relative.

Although a variety of leave and scheduling policies are available to managerial and professional employees and to a lesser extent to union members, un-unionized low-wage workers are less likely to have access to these benefits (Williams 2000; Williams 2010; Williams et al. 2013; Correll et al. 2014). Lambert (2008) argues that the meaning of flexibility changes in the context of low-wage work. For workers at the top of the wage scale, flexibility refers to their ability to change work to fit family. But in the

context of low-wage work, flexibility is used to describe the ability of businesses to rapidly adjust scheduling to maximize profit. Managers use a variety of techniques such as last-minute scheduling, on-call shifts, lack of maximum or minimum hours, and nonstandard scheduling to rapidly adjust their staffing according to demand and thus reduce operating costs. This transfers risk onto hourly-workers. Mangers operate according to Blair-Loy's (2003) work-devotion schema and hold low-wage workers to the same standards of dedication. Low-wage workers are even less able to meet the requirements of the work devotion schema because they lack the financial resources to outsource their childcare and housework responsibilities. Managers, however, view the inevitable tardiness and absences as sign of the worker's moral failing and justification for termination (Correll et al. 2014).

Low wage jobs, especially service occupations, are frequently characterized by irregular schedules with hours that differ from day to day and week to week (Lambert 2008). Professionals and managers occupations are more likely to offer access to flexibility options and paid leave as part of their benefits package at their job (Williams, Blair-Loy and Berdahl 2013). However, professionals and managerial occupations are also more likely to require long hours and expect their employees to overwork (Cha 2010). Clawson and Gerstel (2014) described this disparity between high-wage professional workers and lower wage non-professional workers in their study of healthcare workers. Although all of the healthcare workers were required to work irregular hours, doctors and nurses, the two occupations with the highest pay and most prestige, had significantly more say in the timing and number of their work hours compared to EMTs and nursing assistants.

Workers at the top of the wage scale recognize that they face sharp career consequences for using leave and flexibility policies while workers at the bottom have

few policies or benefits available for them to use. This perception of the workplace as inflexible and hostile to family has shaped how young men and women anticipate structuring their intimate partnerships and building families. In her interviews with young men and women, Gerson (2011) finds that most men and women would prefer egalitarian partnerships where both partners share responsibility for childrearing/housework and financial support. However, men and women perceive that they will likely be unable to actualize these egalitarian partnerships and develop fallback positions. Women fear being trapped by the confines of marriage and the workplace and were most likely to report self-reliance as their second choice and would rather maintain financial dependence even if this means foregoing long-term partnerships. Men, however, were more likely to prefer a neo-traditional fallback arrangement where they are the primary breadwinner and their partner may work for pay but is primarily responsible for childcare and housework. Pedulla and Thébaud (2015) conducted an experimental study using Gerson's premise of workplace constraints impacting preferences for particular arrangements. They concluded that workplace arrangements do affect men and women's anticipated structuring of family responsibilities and that an inflexible workplace hinders the adoption of a gender egalitarian division of labor in the household.

The common argument in these structural explanations for the gender disparity in childcare time is that a 40-plus hour schedule and open schedule availability are incompatible with childcare and other family needs. Men and women would like to more evenly divide work and family care responsibilities. Women's increasing presence in the workforce has been encouraged (or even necessitated) by the increased earnings, control over income, and status that comes with a job. But the revolution at home has stalled because men frequently risk losing status at work and decreasing their earning power and career opportunities by contributing more equally at home.

BREADWINNING STATUS

Despite the fall of the family wage that allowed a segment of the population to achieve middle-class status with only the man's income, breadwinning is still linked to masculinity for many men (Townsend 2002; Anderson 1997; Gerson 1993). Men and women react differently to economic dependency within relationships, and these reactions impact the distribution of power between partners. Maume (2011) found that men in female-breadwinner households spend more time engaged in childcare and attributed this to women's increased power within the relationship, but that their levels of childcare did not match those of women male-breadwinner households. Women who out earn their partners continue to take responsibility for housework and childcare, supporting their femininity and their partner's masculinity (Tichenor 2005). Highly educated women spend more time in a variety of types of childcare, ranging from enrichment activities to basic care, than women with less education despite the fact that these highly educated women are more likely to be employed and to be employed full time (England and Srivastava 2013). Raley et al. (2012) calls this practice gate keeping. They note, however, women in dual-earner couples face time constraints, especially when the women are employed full time, which creates more opportunities and more pressure for the men in these couples to contribute to childcare.

When considering the relationship between household economics and power, we must consider that money does not have a constant meaning (Zelizer 2007). The relationship between income and relationship power is mediated by gender, and the balance of power within a relationship does not always shift in favor of the woman when she out earns her male partner (Bittman et al. 2003; Greenstein 2000; Brines 1994;

Potuchek 1992). Tichenor (2005) attempts to explain why women's breadwinning does not afford them the same power that it does men by arguing that the link between power and money is trumped by the link between power and masculinity in traditional gender ideologies. Brines (1994) suggests that men will sometimes react to financial dependence by redefining the source of their masculinity and contribution to the relationship. England and Srivastava (2013) found that, while education increased women's time spent caring for children, the same was not true of men, except for men who are not employed full-time. For these men who are unemployed or who work part time, education is positively associated with childcare time, allowing for the possibility that these men have a non-traditional gender ideology and are reducing their labor force participation or opting out of the paid labor force entirely to focus on child care.

The norm of involved fatherhood makes it more acceptable and even encourages men to be a good husband and father, not by financially supporting his wife and kids, but by providing day-to-day care for their children. Furthermore, in the case of husbands reducing their labor force participation, the couples have made a decision to temporarily focus on the wife's career, either out of financial necessity or because of the couple's preference (and financial ability) for the husband to temporarily stay home with their children.

THE CURRENT ANALYSIS

I focus on female-breadwinner households as a site for examining gender divisions of childcare because it provides a case that flips the traditionally defined role of breadwinner. In this paper, I look at how the division of childcare differs in female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner couples. Debate exists surrounding how

men react to financial dependence on a female partner. However, like women, men report wanting to spend more time with their children (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Norms of intensive parenting are increasingly requiring more involvement from fathers (Hays 1998). Therefore, I expect that:

H1. Husbands in female-breadwinner households will be more likely to have ever reduced their labor force participation for childcare than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households

H2. Husbands in female-breadwinner households will have higher levels of involvement with children than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households.

When considering the differences between female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner couples, it is important to consider the threat of endogeneity to the validity of my models. Husbands could decide to work part time or to drop out of the labor force, not because wives have better career prospects than them, but because these husbands have low productivity or non-cognitive skills overall compared to other husbands. I use coarsened exact matching to ensure that I compared female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner couples with similar observable characteristics.[2] However, differences between the two categories of couples in earnings, husband's decision to reduce labor force participation for childcare, and other variables could stem from unmeasured factors. I made efforts to control for a number of individual- and

[2] The sample weights in this analysis come from matching on wives' characteristics. I also tested models using sample weights that matched on the husband's and on both partners' characteristics. All models produced similar results.

couple-level demographic and human capital variables and to create matching weights based on these controls to minimize the threat of unobservable characteristics to validity.

Methods

DATA AND SAMPLE

For this analysis, I used the 2008-2013 Survey of Income and Program Participation (2008 SIPP), a large, nationally representative, household-level panel study. The data consists of 16 waves spanning 4 months each for a total of 5 years and 4 months of observations. In addition to the core survey questionnaire, I also included questions from the Child Well-Being and Child Care Modules.

Within the 2008 SIPP, I limited the sample to heterosexual, married couples. While the 2008 SIPP data allowed for identifying cohabiting heterosexual couples and same-sex married or cohabiting couples, I choose to focus on heterosexual married couples. Although the 2008 SIPP is a large dataset, it did not include a sufficient number of married or cohabiting same-sex couples for analysis. I limited the sample to married couples because marriage indicates long-term relationship planning so the couples are likely to have discussed the division of responsibility for earning money and caring for children. I further restricted the sample to couples with at least one child under the age of 18 in residence. For couples who become parents during the panel, I include them starting the first month after the birth or adoption of their child. For couples whose youngest child turns 18 and ages out of the SIPP cutoff for being classified as a child, I include them through the month of their child's 18^{th} birthday. I also excluded couples where one spouse was unemployed for more than half the months they were included in the survey. I wanted to focus on dual-income couples but to allow for seasonal employment or

temporary spells of unemployment. Finally, I restricted the sample to couples where both partners were surveyed and lived in the same household. It was not possible to create measures of relative income for couples with only one partner in the survey because the 2008 SIPP did not collect detailed financial information on non-residents. Furthermore, married couples that live apart are likely to have different childcare requirements and methods of dividing responsibility for children than cohabiting married couples. The final sample included 5,580 married couples observed for a maximum of 64 months.

MODELING AND VARIABLES

The first set of models examined at the relationship between female-breadwinner status and if the husband had reduced his labor force participation to care for children. This primary dependent variable was *husband's reduced labor force participation*, a dummy variable indicating whether the husband had ever reduced his labor force participation to care for children. The 2008 SIPP contained two questions that asked if participants had worked part time or not worked. If participants answered yes to either, they received a follow up question that asked the reason for working part time or not working. One of the answer choices was "taking care of children." I considered if the husband had ever reduced his labor force participation rather than if he was currently working part time or not working because even temporary childcare arrangements, especially those soon after birth and in early childhood, can have long lasting impacts on the division of household labor (Milkman and Applebaum 2013).

The second set of models examined the impact of female-breadwinner status on the husband's involvement in childcare. The dependent variable was *husband's childcare involvement*. I created this scale by totaling the scores of three items: (1) the number of

days each week the husband ate breakfast with each child; (2) the number of days each week the husband ate dinner with each child; and (3) the number of times the husband talked or played with the child for five or more minutes. These questions were asked for each child in the household under the age of 18. The scale ranged from zero to 18, with lower values indicating low or no involvement from the husband and higher values indicating high levels of involvement. I considered the average score on the scale across all children and the highest score on the scale. Both methods produced similar results, and the models presented here used the average score across all children.

Although this scale is an imperfect indicator of husband's contributions to childcare because it does not account for all of the care that children require, nor does it account for the emotional labor that goes into caring for children, it is a useful scale for this analysis because it captures the types of care that men are most likely to perform (Connelly and Kimmell 2010). Men are more likely to spend their childcare time either passively caring for children or engaging in fun activities with children. Passive childcare occurs when the parent and child are in the same vicinity so that the parent is monitoring the child, but the parent and child are not necessarily directly interacting. Sharing a meal with a child is an example of childcare that could be either active or passive. Men are also more likely to spend their childcare time engaging in a fun activity with children like playing a game or reading a book instead of more routine types of care like supervising homework or getting children ready for bed. That the scale captures these more passive and fun forms of childcare means that the estimate of husbands' actual childcare involvement is liberal.

The primary independent variable of interest was *female breadwinner status*, a dummy variable indicating if the wife earns 70% or more of the couple's combined income. I tested models with several cutoffs for relative income, including the wife

earning 60% and 80% of the couple's total earnings. The 70% cut point produced the best balance between selecting couples where the wife earned a significant majority of the couple's combined earnings and maintaining a large enough sample of female-breadwinner households for analysis. Results for the 60% cut point were similar to those presented in these tables, but the 80% cut point was too restrictive for this sample and produced too few female-breadwinner couples for analysis. In the first wave of the sample, slightly more than 18% of the sample consisted of female-breadwinner households. The 2008 SIPP tracked households during the Great Recession, which may have yielded a larger sample of female-breadwinner households than we would expect in a non-recession period. Nearly half of the couples were female-breadwinner at some point during the time they were surveyed, and slightly more than half of the sample changed their female-breadwinner status at least once during the course of the survey. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of female-breadwinner households by income. Female-breadwinner households were fairly evenly distributed by wife's income.[3] Couples who changed breadwinner-status were fairly evenly distributed across income categories. This suggests that female-breadwinner status is not correlated with wife's income or couple's income for this sample. Female-breadwinner households represent a status that may or may not change over time and not a static household formation.

[Insert Table 2.1]

The models included controls for several couple and individual level characteristics (Table 2.2). *Number of older children* is a count of the number of the couple's children age 10 to 17 that lived in the household during the survey period. Both female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had an average of .7

[3] I also investigated distribution of female-breadwinner households by total family income and by husband's income. Female-breadwinner households were similarly evenly distributed in both cases.

older children living in the household.[4] *Number of young children* is a count of the number of the couple's children under age 10 that lived in the household during the survey period. All couples in the sample had at least one older or younger child, and I coded both variables to create a cap of eight. Again, female breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had similar averages for the number of young children in the household with 1.1 and 1.2 children, respectively. *Region* is a categorical indicator for geographic location. Most of the couples lived in the South (33%), followed by the West (25%), Midwest (23%), and Northeast (19%). This distribution was similar for both categories of couples.

[Insert Table 2.2]

Age is continuous for both wives and husbands. The average age in female breadwinner couples was 38.7 for wives and 41.8 for husbands. This was similar to the averages for equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples where the average age was 38.2 for wives and 40.5 for husbands. I also included *age* squared to check for possible non-linear relationship between age and husband's childcare contributions. *Occupation* in the 2008 SIPP used 2002 Census Occupation Codes. I divided occupations into six categories: professional/managerial, technical, service, sales, clerical, and blue-collar/manufacturing. The distribution for wives' occupations was mostly similar across the two categories of households, with the exception of clerical occupations; wives in female-breadwinner households were less likely to work in clerical occupations than wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households. There was less similarity in the distribution of husbands' occupations. Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to work in a professional occupation and less likely to work in a blue-

[4] Descriptive statistics are provided for the final sample of couples who were matched with coarsened exact matching. The matching process is discussed in further detail in the section on matching and weights.

collar/manufacturing occupation than husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households.

Job tenure is a continuous measurement of the number of years the person has spent working in the same job. I created it by subtracting the starting date of the job from the interview month and year. The average length of tenure was a bit over six years for both husbands and wives. Wives and husbands in female-breadwinner couples had slightly longer tenures than their counterparts in equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples with a difference of a just less than five months. *Work hours* is a continuous measure of the average number of hours worked each week in the last month. Wives from both categories of household had similar averages for work hours at around 37 hours per week. Husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households had slightly longer work hours at 42 hours per week compared to 40 hours for husbands in female-breadwinner households. *Education* was measured using 16 categories in the 2008 SIPP. I reduced the number of categories to four: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate. Both categories of couples had similar education levels. For wives, 38% had a college degree, 36% had some college, 19% had graduated high school, and 6% had not completed high school. For husbands, 29% had a college degree, 34% had some college, 27% had graduated high school, and 10% had not completed high school. *Race* is divided into four categories: white, Black, Asian or Other, and Hispanic/Latino. The distribution for both wives' and husbands' race was similar across female-breadwinner and equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples. For wives, 72% were white, 7% were Black, 12% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were Asian or other. For husbands, 70% were white, 7% were Black, 14% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were Asian or other.

MATCHING AND WEIGHTS

I addressed the potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to husband's contributions by using coarsened exact matching. This method allowed me to compare wives in female-breadwinner households to wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households who were similar in salient characteristics. Matching techniques "prune observations from the data so that the remaining data have better *balance* between the treated and the control groups, meaning that the empirical distribution of the covariates (X) in the groups are more similar" (Blackwell et al. 2009). Coarsened exact matching differs from other types of matching like propensity score matching because it only requires that the data is temporarily put into similar segments and matched between the control and treated group. This process produces a sampling weight that can be applied to the original, uncoarsened data. This is especially useful for continuous measures like job tenure and age because CEM will temporarily group these measures into segments to produce sampling weights, transforming them from continuous to categorical, but the sampling weights can then be applied to the original continuous variable in regression models. I matched on the wife's characteristics because my research questions depend on the husband's special characteristics differing from his counterparts in the equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples, in this case, his increased involvement to childcare and decreased commitment to paid work.[5]

In this analysis, male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples were the untreated group and female-breadwinner households were the treated group. I used CEM to match the treated and untreated groups on wife's education, race, occupation, and job tenure as well as the couple's number of children age 10 to 17 and number of children under age

[5] I also tested models using sample weights that matched on the husband's and on both partners' characteristics. All three models produced similar results to the models presented here.

10 and geographic region of residence. One benefit of the CEM command used for coarsened exact matching is the ability to define how the data is coarsened for variables with theoretical meaningful cut points. I specified cut points for education (less than high school, finished high school, some college, and college graduate), number of children age 10 to 17, and number of children under age 10 (1, 2, and 3 or more children). I allowed the CEM command to determine cut points for the remaining variables. I applied the CEM weights to both model sets.

MODELING

I produced both set of models using mixed effects techniques. In the models, race used random effects and the remaining variables used fixed effects (husband's reduced labor force participation, husband's childcare contributions, female-breadwinner status, number of younger children, number of older children, region, age, occupation, work hours, and job tenure). The first set used a mixed effects logit model and the second set used a mixed effects regression model. The first model uses logistic regression because the dependent variable is binary. Mixed effects models allow for both fixed effects for factors like race that remain constant across the duration of the longitudinal analysis and mixed effects for factors like job tenure that might change one or more times during the panel. Mixed effects controls for the intra-subject correlation, making it useful for longitudinal data where the same individual has repeated measures over the life of the panel.

I present nested models, each adding additional controls and interactions to the base model. For both model sets, model 1 was the base model without interaction effects.

Subsequent models added interactions between female-breadwinner status and other variables.

Results

The primary aim of this analysis is to identify how the division of childcare in female-breadwinner households differs from the division in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. I start by describing husbands' reduced labor force participation for childcare in the two categories of households in the first set of models. The second set of models examines how husband's involvement in childcare differs between the two groups.

HUSBAND'S REDUCED LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

The first model set looks at the relationship between husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare and female-breadwinner households. Table 2.3 presents mixed effects logit models with sample weights from coarsened exact matching. Model 1 regressed husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare on female-breadwinner status and human capital and demographic variables.[6] Model 2 added an interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and occupation for both wives and husbands. These tables contain the exponentiated coefficients and represent the relative odds of having ever reduced labor force participation for childcare.

[Insert Table 2.3]

[6] Demographic and human capital characteristics include age, age squared, occupation, work hours, job tenure, education, and race

Table 1 shows that only a small percentage (6%) of the sample of couples has a husband who worked part time or did not work and gave childcare as the reason. This is consistent with research demonstrating that employees anticipate employer bias against workers who use flexibility policies and may believe that their requests to use flexibility policies will be denied outright (Brescoll, Glass, and Sedlovskaya 2013). Husbands in female breadwinner households were more likely to have ever reduced their labor force participation for childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households, providing support for Hypothesis 1.

The presence of both older children between the ages of 10 and 17 and younger children under age 10 increased the likelihood the husband had ever reduced his labor force participation. Both coefficients were positive and significant but the effect size for older children was larger than the effect size for younger children. This was likely an exposure effect; households with older children had children present for a longer duration, meaning there was more opportunity for the husband to reduce his labor force participation for childcare.

Both wife and husband's education had significant and positive coefficients, meaning that education was associated with increased likelihood that husbands reduced their labor force participation for childcare. Husbands were more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare if the wife or husband was in a professional or managerial occupation compared to any other occupation. The coefficients for non-professional occupations were all less than one and several were significant, including husbands and wives in service and clerical occupations and husbands in sales and blue-collar/manufacturing occupations. Technical occupations were not significantly different from professional occupations in their likelihood of having a husband who had reduced his labor force participation for childcare.

[Insert Figures 2.1 and 2.2]

Model 2 added an interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and occupation (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). For wife's occupation, husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to have ever reduced their labor force participation than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. The same was not true for husband's occupation. Husbands in service and blue-collar/manufacturing were less likely to have reduced their labor force participation if they were in a female-breadwinner household. Looking at male-breadwinner and equal-earner households, both spouse's occupation produced a similar pattern with professional and managerial occupations as the most likely and sales as the least likely to have a husband who had reduced their labor force participation for childcare. The patterns were different for husbands and wives in female-breadwinner households. For wives, working in professional and managerial occupations provided one of the lowest likelihood of having a husband who had reduced his labor force participation for childcare with only clerical occupations scoring lower. The pattern was reversed for female-breadwinner husbands, with professional and managerial occupations having one of the highest likelihoods of reducing labor force participation for childcare, surpassed only slightly by husbands in technical occupations.

HUSBANDS' CHILDCARE INVOLVEMENT

In this section, I look at husbands' involvement in childcare. Table 2.4 presents mixed effects regression models of husbands' contributions to childcare regressed on female breadwinner status with variables for demographic and human capital characteristics. The models were weighted with sample weights from coarsened exact matching. Model 1 regressed husband's childcare involvement on the same human capital

and demographic variables included in the previous model set. I also included husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare as an independent variable in this model set because men who take leave for childcare are likely to continue providing care even after the end of the leave period. Model 2 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare. Model 3 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and occupation to Model 1. Model 4 included both interactions.

[Insert Table 2.4]

Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to be involved with children than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples. The coefficient was positive and significant in all models. This provides support for Hypothesis 2.[7] Although the coefficient was statistically significant, the effect size was practically very small in the first two models. The size and statistical significant both increased in Model 3 with the addition of an interaction between female-breadwinner status and each spouses' occupation. Husbands in female-breadwinner households scored one third of a point higher on the childcare involvement scale than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households.

Coefficients for the number of children age 10 to 17 and the number of children under were 10 were significant.[8] The coefficients were negative and significant across all models, with older children depressing husband's involvement slightly more than

[7] Brines (1994) suggests that the relationship between men's contribution to childcare and their economic dependency in their relationship is u-shaped. To test for non-linear relationships, I reran the models presented in this section and substituted a continuous measure of relative income for the binary female-breadwinner status variable. I created relative income by dividing the wife's income by the couple's total income. The coefficient for relative income remained significant and positive, indicating a linear relationship between husband's childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status.

[8] These models use the average score for husband's involvement across all household children. I also tested models that used the highest score across all children. The models using the highest score of husband's involvement across all children produced similar results to the models presented here.

younger children. This was an unexpected results; a likely explanation is that husbands with multiple children are actually spending more total time and are more involved overall, but that their average involvement score was lower because it was spread across multiple children.

The models also controlled for the couple's geographic region with the Northeast as the omitted category. Husbands in the West, South, and Midwest had less involvement with childcare than their counterparts in the Northeast. The largest and most significant difference was between the Northeast and West, with husbands in the West scoring almost 4 points lower on the childcare involvement scale.

Husband's childcare involvement decreased with both spouses' age. Although this effect size was small, when considering an age gap of a single year, the difference becomes more pronounced and practically significant when comparing a woman who is 25 to a woman who is 45. This translates into a 2.4-point difference in the husband's childcare involvement scale. This was consistent with Gerson's (2011) finding that younger men are more inclined toward egalitarian parenting arrangements than previous generations.

Husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare increased their score on the childcare involvement scale. The coefficients were small but statistically significant. Model 2 added an interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare. The female-breadwinner coefficient remained positive and significantly and was mostly unchanged from the uninteracted model. The magnitude of the husband's reduce labor force coefficient dropped, but it remained positive and significant. The interaction term was also positive and significant, indicating that husbands in female-breadwinner households had higher involvement scores when they worked part time or did not work. Figure 2.3 illustrates these

relationships with coefficients from Model 4. Husbands in female-breadwinner households who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare had the highest boost to their involvement score, followed by husbands in female-breadwinner households who had not reduced their labor force participation, husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households who had reduced their labor force participations, and husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households who had not reduced their labor force participation had the lowest score.

[Insert Figures 2.4 and 2.5]

Looking at Model 1, husbands had lower scores on the involvement scale when either spouse worked in a sales occupation and when husbands worked in blue-collar/manufacturing positions, compared to their counterparts in professional and managerial occupations. When we look at the interaction between female-breadwinner status and occupation in Models 3 and 4 for both wife and husband's occupations, husbands in female breadwinner households were generally more involved than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Couples in blue-collar/manufacturing occupations were the exception to this trend. When either spouse worked in blue-collar and manufacturing occupations, husbands had higher levels of involvement when they lived in male-breadwinner and equal earner households. When wives worked in blue-collar/manufacturing occupations, husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households had very high levels of involvement, but husbands in female-breadwinner households had low levels of involvement. This may be partially explained by the prevalence of nonstandard work hours in blue-collar jobs and couples adopting split shift parenting arrangements (Brines 1994; Lambert 2008).[9] When

[9] Split-shift parent describes arrangements where parents work opposite shifts to maximize parental availability for childcare. For example, the father works 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. and then the mother works from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.

the wife earns more, however, she may use her earnings to purchases substitute childcare, explaining the low levels of involvement from husbands in female-breadwinner households.

Discussion

In these models, I examined husband's likelihood of reducing his labor force participation for childcare and husband's involvement in childcare in female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households.

Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare by working part-time or not working. When thinking about a family deciding that the husband will reduce his work time to care for the children, there are two important considerations. First, can the couple afford for the husband to reduce his work time? This factor is heavily dependent on occupation. Men and women in lower-skill and lower-paying occupations are less likely to have access to paid parental leave or flexibility options like working part time temporarily because these benefits are treated like perks and used to reward valuable employees. Professionals and managers are more likely to have access to flexibility options and paid leave as part of their benefits package at their job (Williams, Blair-Loy and Berdahl 2013).

In most states, the Family Medical Leave Act is the only option for workers without paid parental leave or the option to temporarily decrease to part time work. The FMLA offers unpaid parental leave for employees working in large companies who have been with their employer for at least a year (Milkman and Applebaum 2013). Low-wage workers are less likely to be able to afford to live on only one spouse's salary and are less likely to extend the parental leave for either spouse past what is necessary for the

mother's post-partem recovery. Analysis of California's Paid Family Leave Program that provides six weeks of partially paid leave to care for newborns or family members found that men were more likely to take parental leave after having a child and tended to take longer parental leaves after the program was implemented. Affordability is a large barrier to taking leave, and it is significant that in this analysis couples where either spouse worked in a professional occupation were significantly more likely to have had the husband reduce his labor force participation for childcare. Professional husbands are more likely to have access to paid leave and professional husbands and professional wives are more likely to be able to afford the loss in income for the husband to work part time or take an unpaid or partially paid leave.

The second factor is whether the husband is willing to reduce his labor force participation. Men who use flexibility policies like working part time or taking time off to care for children experience negative job consequences in the short and long term. Like women, men who reduce their hours, take a career break, or leave the labor force for family reasons face sharply reduced earnings (Coltrane et al. 2013). Reduced labor force participation results in lost human capital, putting parents who take leave after birth or later at a disadvantage compared to their peers with continuous work histories. Taking leave or using flexibility policies for childcare have gendered consequences. For professional men, working long hours conforms to traditional notions of masculinity (Blair-Loy 2003; Williams 2010). Work is viewed as compatible with (uninvolved) fatherhood and men who scale back work for family reasons face censure (Vandello et al. 2013). For non-professionals, employers rely on economic control while professional employees internalize the ideal worker ideology (Williams, Blair-Loy, and Berdahl 2013).

The financial consequences of deviating from ideal worker norms and pressure to conform to masculine ideal worker norms disincentivize men from reducing their work hours to care for children. As Gerson (2011) suggests, men may prefer an egalitarian division of household labor, but fall back on a neo-traditional arrangement when working conditions preclude an equal sharing arrangement. This analysis suggests that men who are able to reduce their labor force participation still choose to do so.

Husbands in female-breadwinner households had higher levels of involvement with childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples. However, the effect size was small and husbands in female-breadwinner households only scored one third of a point higher on the 18-point scale. Husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare and its interaction with female-breadwinner households were also significant. When the coefficients are combined, husbands in female-breadwinner households who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare scored three quarters of a point higher on the involvement scale.

When looking at the interaction between occupation and female-breadwinner status, there were a few exceptions to the trend of husband's in female-breadwinner households contributing more to childcare. In male-breadwinner and equal-earner households, husbands had a very high involvement score when wives worked in a blue-collar occupation. Hochschild (1997) and Lambert (2008) note that blue-collar occupations often require regularly scheduled non-standard worker hours in the form of evening and overnight shifts. This is conducive to and may even necessitate split-shift parenting, especially in low-income households.

Husbands in male-breadwinner and equal earner households had higher levels of involvement than those in female-breadwinner households when either spouse works in a blue-collar/manufacturing position. Husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner

households were also more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare if he worked in a service or blue-collar/manufacturing job, compared to their counterparts in female-breadwinner households. Brines (1994) argues that breadwinning is associated with masculinity for many men and that men react to financial dependence in different ways. Some men shift their conception of masculinity away from supporting the family financially and toward being an involved father and equal contributor to reproductive labor in the home. Other men, especially those with more traditional gender attitudes, react to a perceived blow to their masculinity by distancing themselves from tasks like housework and childcare. Brines' argument of family context shaping men's reactions to financial dependence helps to explain the overall positive female-breadwinner effect on husband's involvement and reduced labor force participation for most occupations and the exception we saw in blue-collar/manufacturing and service occupations. The 2008 SIPP did not ask about gender ideology, but a future topic for investigation would incorporate a measure of gender ideology into the analysis of reproductive labor in female-breadwinner households.

This analysis has several limitations that are important to note. First, the 2008 SIPP does not contain measures of the mother's involvement with childcare. Although we do know that some husbands are contributing more than other husbands, I am not able to compare husband and wives' involvement in or determine if husband's contributions reduce the amount of childcare contributed by wives. Second, while I include two measures of husband's contributions to childcare, this does not capture all of the childcare and housework that they are performing and presents a potential threat to the face validity of the scale. A better scale would have also considered how much time husbands contributed toward childcare (ideally as a percentage of total parental childcare time) or husbands' involvement in more essential care tasks like meal preparation,

transportation, and emergency or weekday care for children. The current scale remains a useful measure, however, because it considers the types of childcare tasks that men are most likely to perform.

This analysis suggests that men are more likely to take time off to care for children and to be more involved in childcare when they live in female-breadwinner households. Men are also more likely to reduce their labor force participation when they work in professional/managerial or technical occupations that are more likely to offer flexibility benefits. The culture of overwork and absolute worker flexibility fails to realize that a minimum level of care is necessary to maintain workers and to raise children. These structural constraints at work contribute to the stalled revolution in the home. Husbands who reduced their labor force participation for childcare continued to be involved in childcare at a higher rate than those who did not. This analysis and others suggest that men want to contribute more equally to childcare and that they are more likely to choose to do so when structural constraints are eased. However, we are unlikely to see wide scale adoption of egalitarian parenting practices until the ideal worker norm is modernized to account for a dual-income or single-parent household and recognize (and compensate parents for) the diffuse benefits of raising children to employers and society.

Table 2.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife's Income

Wife's Income by Decile		Male-Breadwinner and Equal-Earner Households	Female-Breadwinner Households	Total
(Lower Income)	**1**	0.11	0.11	0.11
	2	0.10	0.09	0.10
	3	0.10	0.11	0.11
	4	0.10	0.07	0.10
	5	0.10	0.11	0.10
	6	0.10	0.09	0.10
	7	0.11	0.11	0.11
	8	0.10	0.08	0.10
	9	0.10	0.12	0.10
(Higher Income)	**10**	0.08	0.10	0.08
	Total	1.00	1.00	1.00
	N	4567	1013	5580

Table 2.2: Means and Distributions by Female-Breadwinner Status

	Total	MBW & Equal Earner	Female Breadwinner	
Income				
Wife's Monthly Earnings	$2,931	$2,683	$4,052	***
Husband's Monthly Earnings	$4,480	$5,369	$2,947	***
Dependent Variable				
Husband's Involvement Scale	9.1	9.1	9.1	
Husband's Reduced LFP	.06	.05	.08	*
Controls				
Number of Kids 10-17	.7	.7	L7	
Number of Kids <10	1.2	1.2	1.1	
Region				
Northeast	.19	.19	.20	
Midwest	.23	.23	.20	
West	.25	.25	.26	
South	.33	.33	.33	
Wife's Characteristics				
Wife's Age	38.3	38.2	38.7	
Wife's Occupation				*
Professional	.36	.36	.34	
Technical	.11	.10	.12	
Service	.17	.17	.20	
Sales	.08	.07	.09	
Clerical	.21	.23	.16	
Blue Collar	.07	.07	.09	
Wife's Job Tenure	6.1	6.1	6.4	
Wife's Work Hours	36.9	36.5	36.4	
Wife's Education				
Less than High School	.06	.06	.08	
High School Graduate	.19	.19	.20	
Some College	.36	.37	.34	
College Graduate	.38	.39	.38	
Wife's Race				
White	.72	.72	.71	
Black	.07	.07	.06	
Asian or Other	.09	.09	.10	
Hispanic/Latino	.12	.12	.13	
Husband's Characteristics				
Husband's Age	40.7	40.5	41.8	
Husband's Occupation				***
Professional	.46	.41	.70	
Technical	.02	.03	.01	
Service	.09	.09	.06	
Sales	.07	.07	.03	
Clerical	.05	.06	.04	
Blue Collar	.31	.34	.16	
Husband's Job Tenure	6.2	6.1	6.4	
Husband's Work Hours	38.7	39.8	42.1	*
Husband's Education				**
Less than High School	.10	.10	.11	
High School Graduate	.27	.26	.28	
Some College	.34	.34	.33	
College Graduate	.29	.30	.28	
Husband's Race				
White	.70	.70	.69	
Black	.07	.07	.08	
Asian or Other	.09	.09	.10	
Hispanic/Latino	.14	.14	.13	

Table 2.3: Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation Mixed Effects Logit

	Model 1		Model 2	
Female Breadwinner	1.41	***	1.25	***
Number of Kids 10-18	1.91	***	1.99	***
Number of Kids <10	1.47	***	1.51	***
Region				
(Northeast)				
Midwest	0.89		0.91	
West	1.63		1.68	
South	0.68		0.66	
Wife's Age	0.85		0.81	
Wife's Occupation				
(Professional/Managerial)				
Technical	0.88		0.32	**
Service	0.30	***	0.12	***
Sales	0.68		0.03	**
Clerical	0.46	**	0.38	*
Blue Collar/Manuf.	0.62		0.30	*
Wife's Job Tenure	0.96	*	0.96	**
Wife's Education	1.35	***	1.36	***
Husband's Age	0.91		0.90	
Husband's occupation				
(Professional/Managerial)				
Technical	0.63		0.51	
Service	0.11	***	0.27	**
Sales	0.00	***	0.00	***
Clerical	0.13	***	0.11	***
Blue Collar/Manuf.	0.10	***	0.19	***
Husband's Education	0.73	***	0.73	***
FBW*Wife's Occupation				
(Professional)				
Technical			2.15	***
Service			3.20	***
Sale			3.38	***
Clerical			1.55	
Blue Collar/Manuf.			1.99	*
FBW*Husband's Occupation				
(Professional)				
Technical			1.52	
Service			0.33	*
Sale				
Clerical			1.09	
Blue Collar/Manuf.			0.42	*
Constant	13.02		9.40	
N	68,444		68,444	

Note: Models control for wife's and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure.

* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001

Table 2.4: Husband's Childcare Involvement Mixed Effects Regression

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Female Breadwinner	0.07	*	0.08	*	0.34	***	0.36	***
Husband's Reduced LFP	0.23	*	0.19	**	0.27	**	0.23	**
Number of Kids 10-18	-0.43	***	-0.43	***	-0.43	***	-0.43	***
Number of Kids <10	-0.34	***	-0.34	***	-0.34	***	-0.34	***
Region								
(Northeast)								
Midwest	-0.51	*	-0.52	*	-0.51	*	-0.52	*
West	-3.92	***	-3.92	***	-3.95	***	-3.96	***
South	-0.47	*	-0.47	*	-0.46	*	-0.46	*
Wife's Age	-0.12	**	-0.12	**	-0.12	**	-0.12	**
Wife's Occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	0.21	*	0.21	*	0.32	***	0.32	***
Service	0.25	***	0.26	***	0.14	*	0.14	*
Sales	-0.18	*	-0.18	*	-0.20	*	-0.20	*
Clerical	0.19	***	0.19	***	0.26	***	0.26	***
Blue Collar/Manuf.	1.27	***	1.27	***	1.55	***	1.55	***
Wife's Job Tenure	-0.03	***	-0.03	***	-0.03	***	-0.03	***
Wife's Education	0.07	***	0.07	***	0.09	***	0.09	***
Husband's Age	-0.16	***	-0.16	***	-0.16	***	-0.16	***
Husband's occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	0.66	***	0.67	***	0.41	*	0.42	*
Service	0.05		0.05		0.06		0.05	
Sales	-0.27	***	-0.28	***	-0.23	**	-0.23	**
Clerical	0.13		0.13		0.20	*	0.20	*
Blue Collar/Manuf.	-0.29	***	-0.29	***	-0.11	*	-0.11	*
Husband's Education	-0.08	***	-0.08	***	-0.08	***	-0.08	***
FBW*Husband's Reduced LFP			0.14	***			0.16	***
FBW*Wife's Occupation								
(Professional)								
Technical					-0.74	***	-0.74	***
Service					0.47	***	0.47	***
Sale					0.03		0.03	
Clerical					-0.29	***	-0.30	***
Blue Collar/Manuf.					-1.40	***	-1.41	***
FBW*Husband's Occupation								
(Professional)								
Technical					1.21	***	1.20	***
Service					0.23	*	0.22	*
Sale					0.31	*	0.30	
Clerical					-0.04		-0.05	
Blue Collar/Manuf.					-0.61	***	-0.62	***
Constant	20.22	***	20.61	***	19.43	***	19.82	***
N	106,682		106,682		106,682		106,682	

Note: Models control for wife's and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure.
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001



Figure 2.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife's Occupation, and Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation: The omitted category is male-breadwinner and equal-earner households where husbands and wives work in professional occupations.



Figure 2.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Occupation, and Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation: The omitted category is male-breadwinner and equal-earner households where husbands and wives work in professional occupations.



Figure 2.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation, and Husband's Childcare Involvement: The omitted category is male-breadwinner and equal-earner households where the husband has not reduced labor force participation for childcare.



Figure 2.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife's Occupation, and Husband's Childcare Involvement



Figure 2.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Occupation, and Husband's Childcare Involvement

CHAPTER 3: THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND MOTHER'S EARNINGS

Introduction

Researchers sometimes call workplaces "greedy" institutions because they often demand complete commitment from employees. Compared to men, women in households with young children devote more time to work, both paid work in the labor force and unpaid reproductive labor at home (Deutsch 1999). In discourse and practice, women are responsible for most of the reproductive labor within households (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Stone 2007). Women's earnings decrease when they have children while men's earnings tend to increase when they have children because men benefit from women's unpaid labor at home (Budig and England 2001; Folbre 2001; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2010). These effects are called the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium.

Yet, in some households, mothers are the primary breadwinners. The 2010 Census shows that the proportion of female-breadwinner households is increasing as the United States moves out of the economic recession (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). Mothers are the only or primary breadwinner in 40% of households with children under age 18, of which 15% are in married couples and 25% are single or cohabitating mothers. My research looks at reproductive labor in female-breadwinner families—heterosexual households where the woman provides a majority or all of the household earnings. Female-breadwinner households are theoretically important for understanding the fatherhood premium and motherhood penalty experienced by mothers and fathers in all

types of household formations because it provides a case that breaks the traditionally defined gender responsibilities within the home. This analysis investigates if the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium are specifically gendered, or whether female-breadwinner households are a test case for finding mothers who experience a breadwinner premium.

Several qualitative interview studies examine how housework and other aspects of reproductive labor are negotiated in female-breadwinner households and theorize how this may impact women's status at work (see Coltrane 1989, Legerski and Cornwall 2010; Chesley 2011). I build on these interview studies by investigating how shifts in contributions to reproductive labor affect women's relationship to market labor and how men's contributions to reproductive labor impact women's career outcomes.

I use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and longitudinal mixed effects methods to model the relationship between husbands' and wives' change in earnings over time and husband's contributions to childcare with a focus on female-breadwinner households. This dataset tracks participants during the Great Recession, which may have yielded a larger sample of female-breadwinner households than we would expect in a non-recession period. I focus on two research questions:

1. How do the careers of mothers who receive significant support from a partner for unpaid reproductive labor differ from the careers of mothers who do not receive significant support?
2. How do the careers of fathers who participate in household reproductive labor differ from the careers of fathers who do not participate significantly in household reproductive labor?

Background

Organizations are gendered, and much of organizational structure is developed around an abstract and disembodied ideal worker who exists only to fill the job (Acker 1990). Organizations constructed this unattainable ideal in the post-war period from men in traditional nuclear families who had wives to take care of their children and day-to-day needs. Collins and Mayer (2010) update Acker's ideal worker with the concept of the solitary wage bargain, which shifts the focus from workplace cultures that support male-biased norms to economic and institutional arrangements that benefit business and harm workers and their families. They argue that workplaces and government have abdicated responsibility for social reproduction, forcing men and women to balance jobs without benefits or schedule flexibility with the day-to-day reproductive labor required to raise the next generation of workers. Using this perspective, men and women who decide to focus on market work and not to participate in reproductive labor make an economic decision in response to the material realities of the market—without some form of outside assistance in the form of social programs subsidizing childcare or extended family members to provide childcare, their market work will suffer if they act as the primary parent for their children.

Mothers earn less than all other workers, both men with or without children and childless women, because mothers have more interruptions in job experience than non-mothers (Budig and England 2001). Coltrane et al. (2013) have replicated Budig and England's (2001) findings using a sample of men, demonstrating that men also face decreased earnings potential when they experience career interruptions related to childcare. For both men and women these interruptions most often take the form of

parental leave for the birth or adoption of a child. Women's primary responsibility for reproductive labor pushes women out of high-pressure, white-collar careers at a greater rate than men (Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Cha 2013). Williams (2000) calls this the "maternal wall" that prevents mothers with reproductive labor responsibilities from conforming to a 40-, 50-, or 60-plus hour per week schedule because they lack support at home. Moreover, women with husbands who work 60 or more hours each week, a phenomenon Cha (2010) calls "overwork," are more likely to leave the paid labor force that women with husbands who work fewer hours. This positive relationship between husband's overwork and wives' likelihood of quitting is strongest for wives who work in professional or managerial occupations that are themselves characterized by a culture of overwork and hostility to deviations from the male ideal worker norm. This positive relationship is even stronger for mothers than for childless women.

Along with longer hours for professionals and managers, workplaces are increasingly requiring hourly employees to be "on call" so managers can adjust to daily and even hourly fluctuations in demand for work hours (Lambert 2008). The employer preference for flexible employees who can match their schedules to the shifting needs of the workplace further marginalizes mothers, especially in working-class jobs that demand the most schedule flexibility of incumbents (Goldin 2001). Norms of overwork and worker flexibility systematically disadvantage women because this culture assumes, encourages, and even requires specialization within households so that workers can avoid family care responsibilities.

Men and women do not freely choose to leave the labor force to fulfill family obligations. Middle-class women who attempt to balance their work and life commitments by reducing their work hours or using other flexibility policies often find themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the "mommy track," or pushed

out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Stone and Ackerly 2013). Working-class women face similar stigma and their job opportunities and options for employment are limited because of their perceived or actual care responsibilities. The problem of "balancing" work and family does not just affect women; however, men also experience strain and risk damaging their career prospects and earnings potential when they contribute to childcare (Coltrane 2013). Men and women both report wanting to spend less time working for pay and more time with their families (Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Like women, men face constrained choices and report reluctance to take advantage of flexibility options at work or to take time off for family or childcare because they fear negative employer evaluations and/or stalled careers. Williams' (2010) analysis of workplace arbitration reports of union employees who were fired or disciplined after family care emergencies found that half of these cases came from men. Overall, men were more reluctant than women to divulge that their absence from work was due to family or childcare reasons. This highlights the reality that in a workforce increasingly comprised of dual-income families, both men and women are struggling to find solutions to their childcare needs that do not compromise their careers.

Several theoretical perspectives explain women's disproportionate responsibility for reproductive labor and the gender pay gap. I start by discussing human capital explanations and them move to review explanations that focus on "doing gender" and discrimination.

HUMAN CAPITAL EXPLANATIONS

When applied to the gender wage gap, the human capital perspective argues that men and women possess different types and levels of human capital and, therefore,

employers compensate them at different rates (Kilbourne et al. 1994; Tam 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002). Men are more likely to develop specialized human capital, which has less transfer value and employers therefore compensate it at a higher rate than non-specialized human capital (Tam 1997). In this scenario, qualities of individuals and not of organizational practices or managerial biases create the gender wage gap—compared to men, women tend to acquire less or less valuable human capital so employers compensate women at a lower rate than men because women are less valuable employees.

Rational choice theories argue that families make decisions about who will perform reproductive labor according to which spouse has the most time and/or least earning potential (Becker 1981). According to this perspective, men often have an advantage in market work because they tend to have higher levels of human capital and they are minimally involved in the biological processes of reproduction. Families generally experience a greater loss of income when men reduce their paid work commitment or take leaves (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Therefore, this perspective argues that heterosexual couples make a rational decision to maximize the financial stability of their families by relying on and investing most heavily in the career of the partner with the most earnings potential at the expense of the career of the partner with the least earnings potential. This will most often result in a man who specializes in breadwinning and a woman who may work for pay full or part time but whose primary responsibility is reproductive labor.

DOING GENDER EXPLANATIONS

Other perspectives argue that human capital and rational economic decision making do not fully explain women's responsibility for reproductive labor and the gender pay gap. The "doing gender" (West and Zimmerman 1987) and feminist psychoanalytic (Chodorow 1978) perspectives argue that heterosexual relationships provide an opportunity for performing gender that allows men and women to highlight gender difference in a way that is pleasurable and builds and affirms identity (Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Reproductive labor is one area that allows men and women to do gender by either participating in or distancing themselves from the traditionally feminine coded activities of housework and childcare (Coltrane 1989; Walzer 1998). Walzer (1989) argues that when couples talk about financial need to specialize, they are more likely to talk about the mother's employment and earnings as optional than to use a similar framing for the father's work. Deutsch (1999) characterizes parents' division of labor not as a fixed arrangement, but as an ongoing and evolving negotiation between both partners. A couple may view or talk about their division of labor as static and stemming from deeply held personal beliefs, but Deutsch argues that both partners affirm and/or resist their involvement in day to day childcare tasks and that these positive or negative reactions reshape the division of labor over time.

In addition to doing gender at home, women's activities outside of the home are informed and limited by the same innate qualities that make women "well suited" for motherhood and reproductive labor. Williams (2010) expands the idea of doing gender at home to the workplace, highlighting the workaholic culture of white-collared managers that persists irrationally despite rarely yielding increased productivity or profits. Rather, the long hours and dedication that alienate these men from their families are an attempt to

prove masculinity in a purportedly gender-neutral environment while distancing themselves from the feminine realm of the home.

DISCRIMINATION EXPLANATIONS

Employers and managers use gendered beliefs about gender appropriate parenting and work commitment to make hiring and advancement decisions in the workplace. Research attributes part of the motherhood penalty to discrimination. Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) argue that motherhood is a status characteristic—a quality that produces biased evaluations of an individual's performance when relevant, including lower salary recommendations, harsher standards for work commitment, and higher standards for perceived competency. Because organizations assume women hold primary responsibility for reproductive labor, women are marginalized in the workplace and valued less by organizations than their "more committed" male peers. Women's perceived "strained commitment" is exacerbated once they have children because employers assume mothers will respond to the increased demands of parenthood by shifting their priorities away from the workplace and toward the needs of their children (Blair-Loy 2003). The opposite is true for men who employers assume become more attached to paid work after having children.

According to these perspectives, gender matters beyond acquisition of more or less valuable types of human capital. Men and women build and affirm their identities by carrying out certain types of activities within and outside of the home, and employers make assumptions about relative commitment and abilities that fall along gender lines because reproductive labor and breadwinning are gendered activities and identities.

THE CURRENT ANALYSIS

This research contributes to the literatures on women's and men's reproductive and paid labor by looking at the careers of husbands and wives in households where the traditional homemaker and breadwinner division of labor is flipped as a new angle for exploring the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. Work and family researchers have extensively documented the strain families experience when balancing the demands of work and family and how women's greater responsibility for reproductive labor suppresses their careers (see Williams 2000 and 2010 for a review). Women who have strong support at home for reproductive labor are likely to make fewer career sacrifices or compromises than women who are primarily responsible for reproductive labor within their households. I expect that wives with support for reproductive labor at home will have better career outcomes, such as higher salaries, and experience less of a caregiver penalty than wives without support. I also expect that men who contribute significantly to household reproductive labor will incur a caregiver penalty analogous to the motherhood penalty that research has documented for women. In this analysis, I expect that:

H3. Wives with husbands who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare at any point will experience a larger increase in earnings than wives with husbands who have never reduced their labor force participation for childcare.

H4. Husbands who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare at any point will experience a smaller increase in earnings than men who have not reduced their labor force participation for childcare.

In this scenario, the husband is shifting attention from market work to reproductive labor in the home. We can expect that the wife will need to focus her attention on market work and that her career will be supported by her husband. Milkman and Applebaum (2013) argue that men who take leave soon after their child(ren) are born retain greater attachment to their child(ren) later in life. Early leaves taken by fathers and early father involvement in childcare, even if it is only temporary, have the potential to impact the couple's division of reproductive labor throughout the dependency of the child and for the duration of the relationship. For this reason, I look at whether the husband has *ever* reduced his labor force participation for childcare instead of whether he is *currently* reducing his labor force participation. Husbands' reduced labor force participation can decrease mothers' caregiver penalty beyond the period of time where the father is the primary caretaker of the children. It also has the potential to result in a caregiver penalty for the man that persists past the time of his reduced labor force participation as we see in the stalled careers of mothers.

The literature on reproductive labor and the gender pay gap has extensively documented the relationship between responsibility for childcare and negative career outcomes. When looking at men's involvement in childcare, I expect that:

H5. Wives with husbands who are more involved with childcare will experience a larger increase in earnings than wives with husbands who contribute lower amounts of childcare.

H6. Husbands who are more involved with childcare will experience a smaller increase in earnings than husbands who contribute lower amounts of childcare.

The final pair of hypotheses addresses the gendered nature of the motherhood premium and fatherhood penalty. The doing gender and feminist psychoanalytic perspectives argue that carework and breadwinning have gendered meanings that help men and women create and maintain gender identities. The ideal of intensive mothering (Hays 1998) is pervasive, and, although fathers face rising expectations for their contributions to parenting, women face harsher standards to be considered "good mothers" and are more frequently and publicly castigated for perceived shortcomings in childrearing. These high standards for mothers make it likely that wives in female-breadwinner households will not stop contributing to housework and childcare within their families. This means that wives in these households presumably spend less time doing reproductive labor than women who do not have a partner who focuses on childcare, but we would not expect breadwinning mothers to focus their work efforts completely on the paid labor force as has been documented with high-achieving, overworked men (Cha 2010). This leads to the following two hypotheses regarding women and men's change in earnings:

H7. Wives in female-breadwinner households will not receive a breadwinner premium comparable to the premium experienced by fathers.

H8. Men in female-breadwinner households will continue to receive a breadwinner premium, but it will be smaller than the premium that men in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households receive.

Employer biases against mothers and in favor of fathers support both the caregiver penalty and the breadwinner premium (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). I expect that a male partner's contributions to reproductive labor will not completely

eliminate the penalty experienced by mothers and that it will not result in a premium similar to that experienced by fathers because of status and discrimination and because wives with significant partner support for reproductive labor are likely to continue contributing significantly to housework and childrearing. Wives' status as mothers will still result in biased evaluations at work, decreased perceptions of workplace commitment, and increased perception of work-family strain, all of which contribute to the caregiver penalty.

For similar reasons, I expect that men in female-breadwinner households and who contribute to reproductive labor at home will experience the benefits of employer's positive characterization of fatherhood and continue to receive a breadwinner premium. Their breadwinner premium may, however, be reduced because men's contributions to reproductive labor at home preclude complete commitment to the workplace and marginalize men who cannot enact the ideal worker norm that is most valued by employers.

Occupation complicates the relationship between female-breadwinner status and earnings growth. Some occupations are more strongly characterized by family friendly or family unfriendly cultures than others. For example, Lambert (2008) notes that employers benefit from the rapid turnover resulting from their family-unfriendly scheduling. Coltrane et al. (2013) found that men suffered reduced earnings when they used flexibility policies at work, but that men in higher status occupations experienced a smaller penalty. Cha (2010) found that women who worked in professional or managerial occupations characterized by expectations of total commitment experienced more negative effects from spousal overwork than similar women in other occupations. For this reason, I look at the interaction between female-breadwinner status and each partner's occupation.

When considering the differences between female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples, it is important to consider the threat of endogeneity to the validity of the models. Husbands could decide to work part time or to drop out of the labor force, not because they are especially committed to childcare, but because their wives have much better career prospects and earnings potential. I use coarsened exact matching to ensure that I am comparing female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples with similar observable characteristics. However, differences between the two categories of couples in earnings growth, husband's decision to reduce labor force participation for childcare, and other variables could stem from unmeasured factors. I have made efforts to control for a number of individual- and couple-level demographic and human capital variables and to create sampling weights based on these variables to minimize the threat of unobservable characteristics.

Methods

DATA AND SAMPLE

For this analysis I used the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (2008 SIPP), a nationally representative household-level survey that was conducted from 2008 to 2013. The survey consists of 16 waves with four months between each wave. The 2008 SIPP Core Survey was administered to all individuals residing within a household and contains detailed information about family composition, individual earnings for all employed household residents, and a job history for each individual. The survey collected information for each of the four months during a wave, yielding a maximum of 64 observations of earnings for each participant.

For these analyses, I restricted the sample to heterosexual married couples with at least one child in residence, where both partners were in the sample and lived in the same household. Although the 2008 SIPP allows me to match unmarried couples, I only included married couples because marriage indicates expectations of long term planning and support within the couple that would allow and encourage both partners to make work and childcare decisions based on the other partner's past, present, and expected future contributions to the household. I further limited the sample to heterosexual couples because, although the SIPP is a large dataset, it did not include a sufficient number of same-sex couples, married or cohabitating, for analysis. I excluded couples where one partner was not in the sample because the 2008 SIPP did not ask questions about reasons for not working or offer a detailed income breakdown for the absent partner. I also restricted the sample to married couples who are living together because the primary aim of this analysis is to analyze the impact of the division of reproductive labor. Although non-cohabiting married couples with children must also negotiate and split childcare, this process and its outcomes likely looks very different from the division of labor between cohabitating spouses. Finally, I restricted the sample to couples where both spouses were employed for at least half of the months they were included in the survey to get reliable earnings data for both partners.

VARIABLES AND CONTROLS

This analysis contains two model sets. The first model set only included the wives from the sample and models the wife's change in earnings. Similarly, the second model set only included the husbands from the sample and models the husband's change in earnings. In the models, race is the only time invariant variable and uses random effects

while the remaining variables vary over time and use fixed effects that consider the within sample variation. My primary dependent variable for both model sets is *total individual earnings*. This is a continuous variable measuring earnings from work in the paid labor force during each month. In both models, I used the natural log of earnings to account for positive skew in distribution of earnings.

I included three primary independent variables of interest in the two model sets. First, *female-breadwinner status* was calculated for each married couple. It is a dummy variable indicating if the wife earns 70% or more of the couple's combined individual earnings. I chose 70% as the cut point to ensure a large disparity in relative earnings to maximize the likelihood that the couple was both aware of the gap in earnings and considered it when making decisions about jobs and the division of household labor. I also considered cut points of 60% and 80% when constructing the models. Models using the 60% cut point produced results similar to those presented here, but the 80% cut point yielded too few female-breadwinner households for analysis. Using the 70% cut point, 18% of the couples in the sample had a female breadwinner in the first wave. Nearly half of the couples were female-breadwinner at some point during the time they were surveyed, and slightly more than half of the sample changed their female-breadwinner status at least once during the course of the survey. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of female-breadwinner households by earnings. Female-breadwinner households were fairly evenly distributed by wife's earnings.[10] Couples who changed breadwinner-status were fairly evenly distributed across earnings categories. This suggests that female-breadwinner status is not correlated with wife's earnings or couple's earnings for this sample and that breadwinner status is not stable within households. Female-breadwinner

[10] I also investigated distribution of female-breadwinner households by total family income and by husband's income. Female-breadwinner households were similarly evenly distributed in both cases.

households represent a status that may or may not change over time and not a static household formation.

[Insert Table 3.1]

The second independent variable is *husband's childcare involvement*.[11] This is a scale created from three variables: 1) a count of the number of times the husband ate dinner with the child(ren) in a week; 2) a count of the number of times the husband ate breakfast with the child(ren) in a week; and 3) a count of the number of times the husband played with or talked to the child(ren) in the past week for more than five minutes. The alpha for this scale was .86. I grouped the scale values into three categories indicating low, medium, and high levels of childcare involvement. Participants answered these questions for each of the couple's children. To standardize the measure across families with different numbers of children, I considered both the maximum and the average score on the scale. Both methods produced similar results. For the model sets presented in this analysis, I used the average score for husband's childcare involvement across all of the couple's household children. I divided the scale into three categories of low, medium and high involvement.[12]

Although the husband's childcare involvement scale did not measure total hours contributed to childcare or include measures of housework, it is a useful measure of the husband's involvement because it captures the type of childcare that men are most likely to provide. When considering all types of reproductive labor, men are more likely to contribute to childcare than to housework (Connelly and Kimmell 2010) and are more likely to spend time playing with children or taking them on weekend outings rather than

[11] The 2008 SIPP only includes measures of the husband's interaction with the children and does not have comparable measures of whether and how frequently wives interact with their children.

[12] I also tested models that used a continuous measure of husband's childcare involvement and models that logged husband's childcare involvement. Models using the logged variable did not have significant effects for involvement. The categorical version of involvement provided the best fit for the models.

contributing to the more routine, day-to-day care activities like bathing young children, helping with homework, and preparing meals (Williams 2000; Stone 2007). Men are also less likely to spend time on the invisible management and emotional labor of childcare; tasks like keeping track of how well children's clothes fit, scheduling medical appointments, and monitoring progress in school.

The final independent variable is *husband's reduced labor force participation*. Because one of the main purposes of the SIPP is to evaluate public program use and effectiveness, it collected detailed information about people's reasons for not working full time. The survey included two questions that asked participants why they were working part time or were not working for pay. One option was "taking care of children." Husband's reduced labor force participation is a dummy variable indicating whether the husband has reduced his participation in the paid labor force to care for children, by either not working or working part time, since having children. I chose to consider whether the husband has *ever* reduced his labor force participation instead of whether he was *currently* working part time or nor working for reasons related to childcare because these temporary arrangements can have a long lasting impact on the household division of childcare (Milkman and Applebaum 2013). Furthermore, taking time off from work or using flexibility policies for childcare is less common for men than women, so this could serve as an indicator of a less traditional and more egalitarian gender ideology.

The models included controls for several couple- and individual-level characteristics (Table 3.2). *Number of children* is a count of the number of the couple's children under age 18 that lived in the household during the survey period. All couples in the sample had at least one child, and I coded the variable to create a cap of eight children. Both female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had an average of 1.8 children living in the household. *Number of young children* is a count of

the number of the couple's children under age 10 that lived in the household during the survey period. The minimum value was zero, and I capped the maximum at eight. Again, female breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had similar averages for the number of young children in the household with 1.1 and 1.2 children, respectively. *Region* is a categorical indicator for geographic location. Most of the couples lived in the South (33%), followed by the West (25%), Midwest (23%), and Northeast (19%). This distribution was similar for both categories of couples.

[Insert Table 3.2]

Age is continuous for both wives and husbands. The average age in female breadwinner couples was 38.7 for wives and 41.8 for husbands. This was similar to the averages for equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples where the average age was 38.2 for wives and 40.5 for husbands. *Occupation* in the 2008 SIPP used 2002 Census Occupation Codes. I divided occupations into six categories: professional/managerial, technical, service, sales, clerical, and blue collar/manufacturing. The distribution for wives' occupations was mostly similar across the two categories of households, with the exception of clerical occupations; wives in female-breadwinner households were less likely to work in clerical occupations than wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households. There was less similarity in the distribution of husbands' occupations. Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to work in a professional occupation and less likely to work in a blue collar/manufacturing occupations than husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households.

Job tenure is a continuous measurement of the number of years the person has spent working in the same job. I created it by subtracting the starting date of the job from the interview month and year. The average length of tenure was a bit over six years for both husbands and wives. Wives and husbands in female-breadwinner couples had

slightly longer tenures than their counterparts in equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples with a difference of a just less than five months. *Work hours* is a continuous measure of the average number of hours worked each week in the last month. Wives from both groups of households had similar averages for work hours at around 37 hours per week. Husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households had slightly longer work hours at 42 hours per week compared to 40 hours for husbands in female-breadwinner households. *Education* was measured using 16 categories in the 2008 SIPP. I reduced the number of categories to four: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate. Both categories of couples had similar education levels. For wives, 38% had a college degree, 36% had some college, 19% had graduated high school, and 6% had not completed high school. For husbands, 29% had a college degree, 34% had some college, 27% had graduated high school, and 10% had not completed high school. *Race* is divided into four categories: white, Black, Asian or Other, and Hispanic/Latino. The distribution for both wives' and husbands' race was similar across female-breadwinner and equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples. For wives, 72% were white, 7% were Black, 12% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were Asian or other. For Husbands, 70% were white, 7% were Black, 14% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were Asian or other.

MATCHING

I addressed the potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to change in earnings by using coarsened exact matching to allow me to compare wives in female-breadwinner households to wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households who are similar in salient characteristics. Matching techniques "prune

observations from the data so that the remaining data have better *balance* between the treated and the control groups, meaning that the empirical distribution of the covariates (*X*) in the groups are more similar" (Blackwell et al. 2009). Coarsened exact matching differs from other types of matching like propensity score matching because it only requires that the data is temporarily put into similar segments and matched between the control and treated group. This process produces a sampling weight that can be applied to the original, uncoarsened data. This is especially useful for continuous measures like job tenure and age because CEM will temporarily group these measures into segments to produce sampling weights, transforming them from continuous to categorical, but the sampling weights can then be applied to the original continuous variable in regression models. I matched on the wife's characteristics because my research questions depend on the husband's special characteristics differing from his counterparts' in the equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples, in this case, his increased involvement to childcare and decreased commitment to paid work.[13]

For coarsened exact matching in this analysis, I used equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples as a control group and female-breadwinner couples as the treatment group. I matched on education, race, number of children, geographic region, wife's occupation, wife's work hours, and wife's job tenure. I specified cut points for education (divided into four groups: less than high school, high school, some college, and college graduate) and number of children (divided into three groups: one, two, and three or more children) based on the distribution of these variables within the data and because these are theoretically meaningful categories for these variables. For the remaining control variables, I allowed the CEM command to determine how to coarsen response categories

[13] I also tested models using sample weights that matched on both partners' characteristics. These models produced similar results to the models presented here.

within the variables. I applied the sampling weights generated from the CEM command to the uncoarsened data in both model sets.

MODELING

I present mixed effects regression models in this analysis. This method of regression allows for both random effects for factors like race that remain constant across the duration of the longitudinal analysis and fixed effects considering the within sample variation for factors like job tenure that might change one or more times during the panel. Mixed effects regression controls for any intra-subject correlation, making it useful for longitudinal data where the same individual has repeated measures over the life of the panel.[14]

I lagged all independent variables by one year in all models, so these models describe the relationship between the husband's involvement, female-breadwinner status, the couple's number of children, and other variables and controls at T_1 on earnings at T_{1+12}. I lagged these predictors because, analytically, I expected it to take time for the husband's involvement and the couple's relative earnings to manifest as a change in either partner's earnings. I tested several lag times ranging from four months to 24 months as well as testing models where variables were not lagged. The 12-month lag produced the best fitting models. The female-breadwinner status variable was derived from the couple's joint earnings and is therefore correlated with absolute earnings. I address this concern by looking at change in individual earnings over time instead of

[14] In the models, race is the only variable that does not vary over time and uses random effects and the remaining variables use fixed effects (husband's reduced labor force participation, husband's childcare contribution, female-breadwinner status, number of young children, total number of children, region, age, occupation, work hours, and job tenure).

absolute earnings and by implementing the lagged structure, which means that female-breadwinner status at T_1 was compared to income at T_{1+12}.

Each of the regression tables presents a set of nested models where logged earnings was regressed on lagged female-breadwinner status, husband's childcare involvement, and husband's reduce labor force participation. The first model presents a base model with no interactions and the following models add interactions to the base model.

Results

CHANGE IN WIFE'S EARNINGS

Table 3.3 presents results for the first set of mixed effect regression models. Wife's logged earnings was regressed on female-breadwinner status, husband's childcare involvement, and husband's reduced labor force participation during the prior year. Model 1 was a base model with controls for both husband and wife's demographic and human capital characteristics. [15] Model 2 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's reduced labor force participation to Model 1. Model 3 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's childcare contributions to Model 1. Model 4 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and both husband and wife's occupations to Model 1.[16]

[Insert Table 3.3]

[15] Demographic and human capital characteristics include age, age squared, occupation, work hours, job tenure, education, and race

[16] I also tested for interaction effects between female-breadwinner status and husband's contributions to childcare as well as between female-breadwinner status and number of children and number of young children.

The coefficient for female-breadwinner status was positive and significant in all models.[17] Wives in female-breadwinner households experienced greater increases in earnings than wives in male-breadwinner/equal-earner households even after controlling for human capital and demographic characteristics.

As expected both the total number of children under age 17 and the number of children under age 10 suppressed wives' earnings growth. Any child suppressed wives' earnings growth with an additional penalty if the child is young. This mirrors research on the motherhood penalty finding that mothers experience a reduction in pay for each child that persists after considering differences in human capital and occupational segregation (see Budig and England 2001). The couple's geographic region affected the wife's earnings growth. Wives living in the Midwest and West both experienced slower earnings growth than wives in the Northeast. Wives in the South also experienced depressed earnings growth, but the results were not statistically significant.

I also included controls for the wife and husband's occupation to address occupational variation in work requirements, work culture, and occupational sex segregation. Compared to professionals and managers, wives in technical, service, and clerical occupations saw slower wage growth while wives in sales and blue collar/manufacturing occupations saw slightly faster wage growth, although the coefficient for blue collar/manufacturing is only significant in Model 4 which adds an interaction between female-breadwinner status and both wife's and husband's occupation.

Model 2 adds an interaction term between female-breadwinner status and husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare. The interaction and main

[17] Since I logged the dependent variable, these figures show the expected percentage change in income for an average household with all other variables held constant.

effects were positive, but only the main effects were significant. Figure 3.1 shows these coefficients. Wives in households where the husband had reduced his labor force participation for childcare at some point experienced a larger increase in earnings compared to wives whose husbands had never worked part time or not worked for pay for childcare reasons. This was true for wives in both categories of households and supports Hypothesis 1, that husband's involvement in childcare had a positive association with wives' earnings growth.

Model 3 included an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's childcare involvement. The main effects were positive and significant, but the interaction term was negative and significant and served as a correction for the uninteracted female-breadwinner effect in Model 1. Figure 3.3 shows these relationships: wives in both household categories experienced larger increases in earnings when the husband had a medium or high score on the involvement scale than when he had a low score. This supports Hypothesis 3.

[Insert Figures 3.1-3.4]

[Insert Figure 3.5]

Occupations characterized by less flexible or family-friendly scheduling suppressed wives' wage growth. We can see this with the female breadwinner interactions for wives in sales and blue collar/manufacturing occupations as well as wives whose husbands worked in service, sales, and blue collar/manufacturing occupations. Even though the wives earned at least 70% of the couple's combined earnings, these husbands were working in occupations characterized by demanding schedules, so the wives were less likely to receive support for reproductive labor at home. This reinforces Cha's (2010) finding that women with husbands who overwork have weaker labor force attachment, especially when the woman works in an occupation that also demands long

hours and is characterized by a lack of flexibility. Although these women are the primary breadwinners in their households, these results suggest that the couples where the husband worked in an occupation that is characterized by overwork did not embrace the wife's status as a breadwinner and she was not making or was not able to make work decisions that increase her earnings.

CHANGE IN HUSBAND'S EARNINGS

The second set of models presented in Table 3.3 uses the same methods and controls as the models from Table 3.4, substituting husband's logged earnings for the wife's earnings. While husband's reduced labor force participation, husband's involvement in childcare, and the couple's female-breadwinner status all had positive and significant effects on wives' earnings growth, the same was not true for husbands' earnings growth. The coefficients for female-breadwinner status were negative and significant, indicating that husbands in female-breadwinner households experienced smaller increases in earnings than similar husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households. This suggests that couples in female-breadwinner households may be acting as Becker (1981) suggests and were making rational decisions to maximize the woman's superior earning power within the relationship at the husband's expense. However, counter to Becker's explanation, this rational decision-making process does not necessarily end with a traditional division of labor, but a decidedly non-traditional one.

[Insert Table 3.4]

One notable difference from the previous model set was the impact of children on change in earnings. The impact for the presence of children under age 18 was negative, but the coefficient for young children under age 10 was positive. That is, husbands with

children under 10 years of age experienced a higher rate of salary increase than husbands without young children. This was not the case for wives' salary, and the presence of children regardless of age depressed wives' earnings growth, suggesting that the effect of young children on earnings growth operated differently for wives and husbands.

The relationship for geographic region also differed between husbands and wives with all of the coefficients acting in the opposite direction. Couples living in the Midwest, West, and South saw a larger increase in husbands' earnings than those in the Northeast, though only the results for the South were significant.

Model 2 adds an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare. The main effects and interaction term were significant and negative, providing support for Hypothesis 2. Figure 3.2 shows that husbands who have ever reduced their labor force participation for childcare experienced a smaller increase in earnings than those who did not, but the coefficient for reduced labor force participation was stronger for husbands in female-breadwinner households.

Model 3 adds an interaction between husband's childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status. Figure 3.4 illustrates these relationships and provides partial support for Hypothesis 4. The main effect for female-breadwinner status remained negative and significant, but the effect for husband's involvement was not significant. The interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband's involvement was negative and significant, indicating that only husbands in female-breadwinner households experienced negative consequences in terms of earnings growth for their higher rates of childcare involvement.

Model 4 includes an interaction term for female-breadwinner status and both husband and wife's occupation. The interaction terms for female-breadwinner status and occupation were negative and significant for all of the wife's occupations except sales

and blue collar/manufacturing and positive for all of the husband's occupations. This indicates that, compared to husbands with breadwinning wives in professional occupations, husbands with breadwinning wives in all other occupations except sales and blue collar/manufacturing saw a smaller change in earnings. The opposite was true for the interaction between husband's occupation and female-breadwinner status; all of the coefficients were positive, indicating that, compared to husbands in professional occupations, husbands in all other occupations with breadwinning wives saw a larger percent increase in earnings.

[Insert Figure 3.6 and 3.7]

Figures 3.6 and 3.7 compare the coefficients from both model sets and show how the impact of living in a female-breadwinner household on earnings growth varies by gender. Husbands who lived in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households experienced the largest percentage and dollar increase in monthly earnings, followed by wives in female-breadwinner households, wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households and then husbands in female-breadwinner households. These figures also depict the change in *monthly* earnings, so the disparity widens when compounded over the course of a year or lifetime. This suggests that the breadwinning premium is not gender neutral because husbands and wives who specialized in breadwinning did not receive similar premiums in earnings growth, supporting Hypotheses 5. I did not find support for Hypothesis 6, however. Husbands in female-breadwinner households did not receive any premium; they in fact received a penalty.

Discussion

In these analyses, I examined the relationship between individual earnings over time and each partner's contributions to earnings and childcare within the home. Female-breadwinner households provide a case where the traditional division of labor is disrupted, allowing for the possibility of wives who specialize in breadwinning with the support of husbands who contribute significantly at home. I investigate whether a gender-neutral breadwinner premium and caregiver penalty exist, or if the penalty and premium are gendered. Can women experience a breadwinner premium when they are the primary earner, and do men experience a caregiver penalty when they contribute to reproductive labor in the home?

Both model sets show that wives in female-breadwinner households experienced larger increases in earnings than wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households; however, wives in both categories of households experienced lower increases in earnings than breadwinning or equal earning husbands, even after controlling for occupation and human capital and demographic characteristics. Husbands in female breadwinner households experienced the smallest increases in earnings of all groups, even smaller than wives in male-breadwinner households. After controlling for human capital and demographic variables, women experienced a breadwinner premium when they provided most of the family's earnings, but it was much smaller in magnitude than that experienced by men. The breadwinner premium is gendered. Even when women specialized in breadwinning, they were held back by discrimination in the workplace or by an unwillingness to cede as much responsibility for reproductive labor as breadwinning husbands often do. However, the caregiver penalty can apply to both men

and women, a finding supported by the multitude of research that has documented the negative effects of reproductive labor on both men's and women's careers.

Husband's contributions to childcare were associated with larger increases in wife's earnings, but did not always negatively affect the husband's own earnings growth. I found a positive relationship between wife's earnings growth and both husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare and husband's childcare involvement. This is consistent with descriptions from interview studies of women scaling back or quitting their jobs because their workplace is hostile to family responsibilities and/or their husbands are unwilling to contribute equally or at all to the second shift (Hochschild 1989; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007). Women experience better career outcomes when they have support for reproductive labor at home.

The impact of husband's contribution to childcare on the husband's own earnings growth differed for the two measures included in the models. Husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare was negatively associated with husband's earnings growth. Husband's childcare involvement suppressed husband's earnings growth, but only for husbands in female-breadwinner households. The differing results for these two measures of husband's contributions to reproductive labor are at least partially explained by the type of contribution and how it interferes with working. Reducing labor force participation interferes with the accumulation of human capital and potentially job tenure if the husband's job changes because of a leave of absence or a reduction to a part-time schedule. Table 3.4 shows that there were fewer husbands who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare in the highest category for job tenure. However, being currently involved in childcare activities did not always have a negative association with earnings growth because it did not necessarily mean the husband was diverting attention away from his career. Table 3.6 shows that the job tenure was more evenly distributed

across husband's childcare involvement. Time spent in childcare activities can come from time normally spent on leisure activities and could be taking place outside of work hours or on non-work days. Time-use studies looking at parents' childcare contributions find that women are more likely than men to be responsible for weekday childcare responsibilities, including assisting with homework and caring for sick children and that men are more likely to contribute to childcare on weekends (Maume 2008; Maume 2011). However, the positive relationship between husband's childcare involvement and wife's earnings growth and the negative relationship for husbands in female-breadwinner households suggest that at least some of the husband's care is relieving the wife's responsibility for childcare.

This analysis has limitations that are important to note. First, while the 2008 SIPP contains measures of the husband's contributions to childcare and interactions with children, it did not ask similar questions about the wife's contributions to childcare. Although we do know that some husbands are contributing more than other husbands, I am not able to determine if husband's contributions reduce the amount of childcare contributed by mothers. Second, while I include two measures of husband's contributions to childcare, this does not capture all of the childcare and housework that they are performing and presents a potential threat to the face validity of the scale. A better scale would have also considered how much time husbands contributed toward childcare (ideally as a percentage of total parental childcare time) or husbands' involvement in more essential care tasks like meal preparation, transportation, and emergency or weekday care for children. The current scale remains a useful measure, however, because it considers the types of childcare tasks that men are most likely to perform.

This analysis supports explanations of the caregiver penalty and breadwinner premium that treat it as a problem extending beyond decision made by individuals or

families. There are two primary components to the gender pay gap: men and women's unequal responsibility for reproductive labor and the incompatibility of the ideal worker norm with the needs of children and families. Regarding the first component, when couples adopt a more gender egalitarian division of labor or have a wife that specializes in breadwinning, the husband's career suffers. This disincentivises men from contributing equally at home and harms women's careers instead. However, even in couples who are engaging in more egalitarian childcare and work practices or who flip the traditionally defined gender roles, this analysis did not find a breadwinner premium for women that is analogous to the fatherhood premium experienced by men. The often-made call for men to change their behavior fails to address the role of the culture of work that is hostile to the family and caregiving needs of its workers.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife's Income

Wife's Income by Decile		Male-Breadwinner and Equal-Earner Households	Female-Breadwinner Households	Total
(Lower Income)	**1**	0.11	0.11	0.11
	2	0.10	0.09	0.10
	3	0.10	0.11	0.11
	4	0.10	0.07	0.10
	5	0.10	0.11	0.10
	6	0.10	0.09	0.10
	7	0.11	0.11	0.11
	8	0.10	0.08	0.10
	9	0.10	0.12	0.10
(Higher Income)	**10**	0.08	0.10	0.08
	Total	1.00	1.00	1.00
	N	4567	1013	5580

Table 3.2: Means by Female-Breadwinner Status

	Total	MBW & Equal-earner	Female Breadwinner	
Dependent Variable				
Wife's Monthly Earnings	$2,931	$2,683	$4,052	***
Husband's Monthly Earnings	$4,480	$5,369	$2,947	***
Independent Variables				
Husband's Involvement	2.0	2.0	2.1	
Husband's Reduced LFP	.06	.05	.08	*
Controls				
Number of Kids	1.8	1.8	1.8	
Number of Kids <10	1.2	1.2	1.1	
Region				
Northeast	.19	.19	.20	
Midwest	.23	.23	.20	
West	.25	.25	.26	
South	.33	.33	.33	
Wife's Characteristics				
Wife's Age	38.3	38.2	38.7	
Wife's Occupation				*
Professional	.36	.36	.34	
Technical	.11	.10	.12	
Service	.17	.17	.20	
Sales	.08	.07	.09	
Clerical	.21	.23	.16	
Blue Collar	.07	.07	.09	
Wife's Job Tenure	6.1	6.1	6.4	
Wife's Work Hours	36.5	36.4	36.9	
Wife's Education				
Less than High School	.06	.06	.08	
High School Graduate	.19	.19	.20	
Some College	.36	.37	.34	
College Graduate	.38	.39	.38	
Wife's Race				
White	.72	.72	.71	
Black	.07	.07	.06	
Asian or Other	.09	.09	.10	
Hispanic/Latino	.12	.12	.13	
Husband's Characteristics				
Husband's Age	40.7	40.5	41.8	
Husband's Occupation				***
Professional	.46	.41	.70	
Technical	.02	.03	.01	
Service	.09	.09	.06	
Sales	.07	.07	.03	
Clerical	.05	.06	.04	
Blue Collar	.31	.34	.16	
Husband's Job Tenure	6.2	6.1	6.4	
Husband's Work Hours	39.8	42.1	38.7	*
Husband's Education				**
Less than High School	.10	.10	.11	
High School Graduate	.27	.26	.28	
Some College	.34	.34	.33	
College Graduate	.29	.30	.28	
Husband's Race				
White	.70	.70	.69	
Black	.07	.07	.08	
Asian or Other	.09	.09	.10	
Hispanic/Latino	.14	.14	.13	

* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001

Table 3.3: Wife's Log Earnings Mixed Effects Regression, 12-Month Lag (N=54,137)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Female Breadwinner (FBW)	0.09	***	0.09	***	0.15	***	0.12	***
Husband's Reduced LFP	0.10	***	0.09	*	0.10	***	0.02	***
FBW*Husband's RLFP			0.01					
Husband's Involvement								
(Low)								
Medium	0.05	***	0.05	***	0.06	***	0.05	***
High	0.07	***	0.07	***	0.08	***	0.07	***
FBW*Husband's Involvement								
FBW*Medium					-0.03	*		
FBW*High					-0.04	*		
Number of Kids	-0.03	***	-0.03	***	-0.03	***	-0.03	***
Number of Kids <10	-0.02	**	-0.02	**	-0.02	**	-0.01	**
Region								
(Northeast)								
Midwest	-0.10	***	-0.10	***	-0.10	***	-0.10	***
West	-0.07	***	-0.07	***	-0.07	***	-0.07	***
South	-0.03		-0.03		-0.03		-0.03	
Wife's Occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	-0.03	*	-0.03	*	-0.04	*	-0.05	**
Service	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***
Sales	0.09	***	0.09	***	0.09	***	0.10	***
Clerical	-0.04	***	-0.04	***	-0.04	**	-0.04	**
Blue Collar/Manuf.	0.04		0.04		0.04		0.05	*
FBW*Wife's Occupation								
Technical							0.06	*
Service							0.01	
Sale							-0.06	*
Clerical							0.00	
Blue Collar/Manuf.							-0.08	*
Husband's Occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	0.10	**	0.10	**	0.10	**	0.12	***
Service	0.03	*	0.03	*	0.03		0.05	**
Sales	-0.06	***	-0.06	***	-0.06	***	-0.05	**
Clerical	0.03		0.03		0.03		0.03	
Blue Collar/Manuf.	0.02	*	0.02	*	0.02		0.04	**
FBW*Husband's Occupation								
Technical							-0.09	
Service							-0.07	**
Sale							-0.11	**
Clerical							-0.01	
Blue Collar/Manuf.							-0.05	**
Wife's Race								
(White)								
Black	0.17	***	0.17	***	0.17	***	0.18	***
Asian or Other	0.10	*	0.10	*	0.10	*	0.10	*
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino	0.08		0.08		0.08		0.08	
Husband's Race								
(White)								
Black	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.19	***
Asian or Other	-0.08	*	-0.08	*	-0.08	*	-0.09	*
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino	-0.06		-0.06		-0.06		-0.06	
Constant	0.12		0.10		0.12		0.13	

Note: Models control for wife and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure.
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001

Table 3.4: Husband's Log Earnings Mixed Effect Regression, 12-Month Lag (N=54,137)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Female Breadwinner (FBW)	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.17	***	-0.24	***
Husband's Reduced LFP	-0.09	*	-0.05	*	-0.09	*	-0.08	*
FBW*Husband's RLFP			-0.16	***				
Husband's Involvement								
(Low)								
Medium	-0.01		-0.01		0.01		-0.01	
High	-0.02		-0.02		-0.02		-0.02	
FBW*Husband's Involvement								
FBW*Medium					-0.04	*		
FBW*High					-0.03	*		
Number of Kids	-0.04	***	-0.04	***	-0.04	***	-0.04	***
Number of Kids <10	0.03	***	0.03	***	0.03	***	0.03	***
Region								
(Northeast)								
Midwest	0.02		0.02		0.02		0.02	
West	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01	
South	0.06	*	0.06	*	0.06	*	0.06	*
Wife's Occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	-0.01		-0.01		-0.01		0.01	
Service	-0.07	***	-0.07	***	-0.07	***	-0.04	*
Sales	0.05	**	0.05	**	0.05	*	0.04	
Clerical	-0.02		-0.02		-0.03		-0.01	
Blue Collar/Manuf.	-0.01		0.00		0.00		0.01	
FBW*Wife's Occupation								
Technical							-0.22	***
Service							-0.50	***
Sale							0.34	***
Clerical							-0.24	***
Blue Collar/Manuf.							-0.12	
Husband's Occupation								
(Professional/Managerial)								
Technical	-0.12	**	-0.12	*	-0.12	*	-0.17	***
Service	0.11	***	0.11	***	0.12	***	0.09	***
Sales	-0.02		-0.02		-0.02		-0.06	***
Clerical	0.01		0.01		0.01		-0.03	
Blue Collar/Manuf.	0.10	***	0.10	***	0.10	***	0.08	***
FBW*Husband's Occupation								
Technical							0.30	**
Service							0.16	***
Sale							0.73	***
Clerical							0.45	***
Blue Collar/Manuf.							0.12	***
Wife's Race								
(White)								
Black	-0.12		-0.12		-0.12		-0.12	
Asian or Other	-0.19	***	-0.19	***	-0.18	***	-0.17	*
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino	0.14		0.15		0.15		0.12	
Husband's Race								
(White)								
Black	0.07		0.07		0.07		0.07	
Asian or Other	0.17	***	0.17	***	0.16	*	0.16	**
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino	-0.18	*	-0.18	*	-0.19	*	-0.16	*
Constant	0.01		-0.01		0.02		0.01	

Note: Models control for wife and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure.
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001

Table 3.5: Crosstabs for Husband's Tenure and Reduced Labor Force Participation

	Husband Ever Reduced Labor Force Participation		
	No	**Yes**	**Total**
Husband's Tenure			
1 Year or Less	.30	.31	.30
2-5 Years	.30	.28	.30
6-10 Years	.20	.25	.21
>10 Years	.20	.16	.20

Table 3.6: Crosstabs for Husband's Tenure and Childcare Involvement

	Husband's Childcare Involvement			
	Low	**Average**	**High**	**Total**
Husband's Tenure				
1 Year or Less	.31	.30	.30	.30
2-5 Years	.30	.30	.31	.30
6-10 Years	.20	.21	.20	.20
>10 Years	.19	.19	.19	.19



Figure 3.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation, and Change in Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 2 in Table 3.2. Husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare and female-breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or omitted value.



Figure 3.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Reduced Labor Force Participation, and Change in Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 2 in Table 3.3. Husband's reduced labor force participation for childcare and female-breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or omitted value.



Figure 3.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Involvement, and Change in Wife's Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 3 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Husband's childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or omitted value.



Figure 3.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband's Involvement, and Change in Husband's Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 3 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Husband's childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or omitted value.



Figure 3.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Occupation, and Change in Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 4 in Table 3.2. Occupation and female-breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or omitted value.



Figure 3.6 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings as Percent



Figure 3.7 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings in Dollars

CHAPTER 4: WOMEN'S CAREER ATTITUDES AND ANTICIPATED CHILDCARE SUPPORT

Introduction

Research describing the link between childcare and mothers' lower earnings argues that an egalitarian distribution of reproductive labor[18] is a necessary precondition for reducing or eliminating the motherhood penalty. (Williams 2010). A majority of young adults prefer an egalitarian division of labor when envisioning their future family lives, but they are skeptical that they will be able to achieve this goal (Gerson 2011). Mothers are pushed out of well-paid but demanding jobs and toward the home because institutions do not make allowances for childcare or other forms of reproductive labor. Having a husband or partner who contributes significantly to childcare may moderate this push by making the task of combining market and household labor more attainable. My research investigates how anticipated support for childcare affects women's preferences for balancing work and family life.

Survey and interview research looking at the relationship between men's contributions to childcare and women's careers is limited because couples self-select into gender-egalitarian or traditional work and family arrangements based on preferences and other factors that these studies can only partially account for. This makes it difficult to isolate the effects of men's contributions to childcare on women's careers. My analysis uses a factorial experimental design to overcome this limitation by using random

[18] Reproductive labor maintains people in daily life and from generation to generation (Glenn 1992). It encompasses routine daily chores like cooking, cleaning, and childcare, and as well as less structured activities like emotional work in maintaining family relationships and continuing cultural and ethnic traditions.

assignment into conditions that vary childcare arrangements to look at the relationship between anticipated partner support for childcare and career attitudes. I investigate the primary research question: How do anticipated contributions to childcare from their future partners affect women's career attachment and aspirations?

I look at two components of husband's contributions to childcare: the *amount* of childcare he performs and the *quality* of the childcare he contributes. Mothers' careers suffer when fathers do not contribute to childcare or ignore women's requests for support (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Folbre 2010). Women are responsible for most of the day-to-day reproductive labor like housework, emotional labor, and childcare that is necessary to maintain individuals and families. In the case of childcare, while women are held accountable for "intensive mothering" (Hays 1997), men "babysit" their own children and are praised as outstanding fathers and husbands for performing routine childcare tasks (Williams 2000).

Differing standards and differences in personal accountability hinder couples' attempts to share childcare (Stone 2007). Women report stress from disagreements about the quality of tasks completed by their husbands and describe redoing household tasks that they considered inadequately completed (Hochschild 1989). Hochschild (1989) described husbands in her sample who avoided childcare or housework responsibilities through strategic incompetence—unknowingly or purposefully doing a bad job when they completed tasks. These and other studies indicate that quality of childcare is also an important factor when considering how anticipated spousal support for childcare will impact women's attitudes and expectations about their careers.

Review of Literature

Although women's labor force participation patterns increasingly mirror those of men, the gender pay gap persists in the form of a motherhood penalty and a fatherhood premium. Workplaces are designed around an ideal worker that marginalizes men and women who have family responsibilities (Acker 1990). Despite movement toward greater sharing of home tasks, women are still responsible for most of a household's reproductive labor including housework and childcare (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Gornick and Meyers 2003, Folbre 2010). Since the 1960s, women's time spent on housework (excluding childcare tasks) has been halved while men's has doubled (Bianchi et al 2000). During this same period, both women and men have increased their time spent on childcare (Bianchi 2000). Yet, most of men's increases in time spent caring for children occur outside of their workweek (Maume 2008). Women are more likely than men to be responsible for both childcare during the workweek and for unscheduled or emergency care like picking up a sick child from school.

In addition to spending more time on routine tasks like monitoring homework and non-routine childcare tasks like planning a birthday party, women are more likely to perform household or childcare tasks that require emotional labor (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000). Keeping track of doctors' appointments, learning and remembering preferences for food, and noticing that a child is about to outgrow her shoes are necessary but are not routine, so the work that goes into tasks of emotional labor often goes unnoticed. Emotional labor is also required when managing the household; even when men contribute to childcare or housework, women are often responsible for knowing what needs to be done to keep family life running smoothly, assigning tasks to household

members, noticing if tasks are forgotten or done incorrectly, and making sure that forgotten tasks get completed by reminding someone or doing the task themselves.

Research describing the link between women's responsibility for childcare and their suppressed careers and earnings potential often points to a more egalitarian distribution of household responsibilities as an essential part of the solution (see Williams 2000, 2010). Gerson (2011) argues that a majority of young adults prefer gender egalitarian divisions of labor in her interview study of adults born in the 1970s and 1980s. This sample and subsequent generations are especially relevant for research on the division of household labor and family formations because Gerson's respondents grew up during the "gender revolution" when standards for family formations widened from a male-breadwinner/female-homemaker arrangement to include dual-income couples. This shift in work patterns resulted in an increase in the proportion of households in which all adults work, creating a time squeeze as dual income couples work full-time jobs while juggling childcare and household responsibilities (Jacobs and Gerson 2004).

Although Gerson's respondents tended to state preferences for relationships with an egalitarian division of labor, they frequently expressed skepticism as to whether they would be able to achieve this ideal within their own households. The men and women perceived that their workplaces were inflexible and made it difficult to combine work and family without sacrificing quality on one or both fronts. This mirrors Stone's (2007) study of highly educated women who decided to leave their careers after failing to find a balance between the demands of work and home.

A common theme in studies of work-family conflict is how the household division of labor exacerbates or ameliorates women's experiences at work. Men and women experience similar pressures at work, but respond to them differently. Pyke (1996) describes the hegemony of the male career as a consequence of a traditional

household division of labor in which the woman shoulders most of the household tasks that then distracts from her career. This dynamic creates or widens disparities in the couple's career prospects and provides a rational foundation for sustaining the unequal distribution of responsibility for maintaining the household and supporting the family financially. In the U.S., men tend to slightly increase their work hours after having children while women tend to slightly decrease their work hours (Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Stone (2007) describes what she calls the yellow light phenomenon where both men and women express willingness to slow down their careers after having children but women are much more likely to follow through and redirect some of their focus toward the home while men are more likely to speed up and redouble their efforts at work.

Stone (2007), Hochschild (1989, 1997), and Blair-Loy (2003) describe couples in their samples where women were primarily responsible for reproductive labor at home. Some of these couples voluntarily created an unequal division of labor because both partners wanted a male-breadwinner/female-homemaker division. The couples agreed that the wife either did not work for pay or performed some market work but that her financial contribution would be secondary to maintaining the home, caring for children, and supporting her husband's career. Other women were unsatisfied with the unequal arrangement and spoke enviously of their husbands' careers. These women were frustrated at their inability to combine their responsibilities at home with their careers and often pointed to a lack of support from their male partners as part of the problem. For the women in Stone's (2007) study, husbands not contributing to the reproductive labor at home played a role in more than half of the women's decision to quit their jobs.

Plans and Expectations for Future Relationships

Because of men's and women's different experiences with and reactions to responsibility for home and work, they differ in their reactions to the perceived incompatibility between the two. Gerson's (2011) respondents expressed a preference for a dual-income household formation with an egalitarian division of reproductive labor, but developed fallback plans in case their first choice proved impossible or unlikely. These fallback plans differed by gender. Most of the women expressed reluctance to enter a relationship that left them economically dependent on their partner and forced them to sacrifice career goals. Women tended to prefer a self-reliant fallback plan where they prioritize their own wellbeing, emotional needs, and personal goals ahead of forming romantic partnerships.

The men, however, most often describe a neo-traditional arrangement as their fallback position in which they focus on providing financially for the family while their partner is responsible for most of the household reproductive labor. Both men and women are reluctant to enter romantic relationships that compromise their careers. For men, this means doubling down on their careers after having children and expecting their wives to make career sacrifices. For women, however, this may mean avoiding or postponing romantic relationships because they recognize or fear that that an egalitarian division of labor will not be possible if they marry and/or have children and that they will be the one who does most of the work at home to the detriment of their professional lives and personal goals.

Men and women's experiences at work affect their preferences for a specific household division of labor. Pedulla and Thébaud's (2015) experimental study looked at the relationship between men and women's preferences for egalitarian, neo-traditional, or self-reliant household arrangements in the presence of workplace constraints. They

confirmed Gerson's (2011) finding that men and women prefer an egalitarian division of labor when given the option. For women, this preference for an egalitarian arrangement was increased when they were primed to think about work place supportive policies, but men did not show any changes in their preferences.

A multitude of research demonstrates that women are pushed out of the workplace and toward the home because institutions do not accommodate their need to provide care for children (Jacobs and Gerson 2001; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Pettit and Hook 2009; Folbre 2010). Middle-class women who attempt to balance their work and life commitments by reducing their work hours or using other flexibility policies often find themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the "mommy track," or pushed out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Stone and Ackerly 2013). Working-class women face similar stigma and their job opportunities and options for employment are limited because of their perceived or actual care responsibilities. Having a husband who contributes a high amount of childcare may moderate this push out of the workplace, possibly making the task of combining work and family responsibilities seem more attainable.

Differences in standards for the quality of childcare and cleanliness sometimes hinder egalitarian distributions of household labor (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Stone 2007). Women report having to redo household tasks completed by their husbands because they felt he completed the task inadequately. Both men and women reported added stress and relationship strain from spousal disagreements about the expected quality of household and childcare tasks. This consideration of perceived quality provides an avenue for examining how the ideology of intensive parenting, or more specifically of intensive mothering (Hays 1997), impacts women's preferences for combining childcare responsibilities with their careers. Hays describes the cultural construction of intensive

mothering that portrays parenting as child centered, time intensive, and best performed by mothers. Intensive mothering rationalizes the special status of mothers in their children's lives and encourages mothers to develop high and particular standards concerning how their children are raised and cared for and, by extension, how their homes are maintained. Although the intensification of parenting has also affected men, women still bear the brunt of these time-intensive parenting practices, as evidenced by fathers being described as "babysitting" their own children and being praised as exceptionally skilled or involved for demonstrating basic competence at parenting tasks (Williams 2000). Considering the quality of husbands' contributions to childcare in the experimental manipulation will capture women's reactions to this idea from intensive mothering that children must be cared for in a particular way and that, as mothers, the women are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the children are well and properly cared for.

HYPOTHESES

The survey-experimental research design will allow me to investigate how the anticipated availability of partner assistance in caring for children affects women's expectations and attitudes about their careers. First, the literature describing mothers "opting out" of the labor force suggests that the anticipated *amount* of care provided by husbands will affect women's career attitudes and preferences. I therefore predict that:

H9. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) *amount* of childcare will increase (or decrease) women's career *attachment* compared to the control condition.

H10. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) *amount* of childcare will increase (or decrease) women's career *aspirations* compared to the control condition.

Second, when considering how anticipated support for childcare impacts women's career preferences, the *quality* as well as the *amount* of childcare husbands contribute is important. The model of intensive mothering and the association of women with the ultimate responsibility for children's care and wellbeing, as well as literature discussing how men and women negotiate the division of household labor, suggest that the *quality* of childcare provided by husbands may have a significant and separate effect from the *amount* of childcare. Therefore, this project also addresses the effects of husbands' perceived competency in family care. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H11. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) *quality* of childcare will increase (or decrease) women's career *attachment* compared to the control condition.

H12. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) *quality* of childcare will increase (or decrease) women's career *aspirations* compared to the control condition.

Finally, I expect the effects of amount and quality will interact and that a low value for one will mute a high value for the other. For example, in the case of a husband that provides a high amount of childcare but of a low quality, the negative effect of quality mute the positive effect of amount and I would expect to see a lower effect size for amount for this condition. I predict that:

H13. The effect of high or positive values for each of the two indicators will be muted by low or negative values for other indicators.

Methods

I collected original survey experiment data to address the research questions. I fielded the survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a platform where people perform small tasks like data entry, writing, or completing surveys in exchange for pay. Kress et al. (2017) compared MTurk samples to samples from professional panel samples and student panel samples and found the data from MTurk respondents was of equal or higher quality compared to data from the other sources after considering factors like responses to attention-check questions, reported rates of multi-tasking during the survey, and length and quality of open-ended responses. Buhrmester et al (2011) found that MTurk respondents have a high test-retest reliability that matched other data collection methods, indicating that respondents report the same attitudes or respond similarly to prompts when tested at different points in time.

Although MTurk does not provide a nationally representative sample and differs in some demographic characteristics from nationally representative samples, comparisons between MTurk and online population-based panels show that both methods produce similar results (Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014). MTurk samples are generally more diverse than convenience and student samples, but fall short of national probability samples (Berinsky et al. 2012). MTurk samples are younger, have lower average incomes (likely related to lower age), and underrepresent Blacks and Hispanics compared to the national probability sample from the Current Population Survey (CPS). My study focuses

on the expectations and attitudes of younger women, so the underrepresentation of older participants will not affect the validity of this study. I will, however, need to consider the racial composition of my sample and its representativeness when considering the generalizability of my results.

SAMPLE

I used MTurk to recruit young (age 18-32), unpartnered women without children who lived in the United States. I limited the sample to women because research shows men's career attitudes are not impacted as strongly by partner support for childcare (Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). Men do experience negative career consequences when they deviate from ideal worker norms for reasons related to childcare (Coltrane et al. 2013). However, women continue to hold primary responsibility for childcare and, therefore, are more likely to experience negative career consequences after having children. I further limited the sample to unpartnered women without children because women who are already married or have children are likely to have already made decisions about how to divide their commitments between family care and paid work with their partners, limiting the effectiveness of my manipulations.

I aimed to recruit 1,495 participants to yield 166 participants in each of the nine experimental conditions. I used G*Power software to ensure that this sample size would yield enough statistical power to detect moderate effect sizes with an alpha level of 0.05. The survey sample size was 1,495.

I included two manipulation checks at the end of the survey that asked participants to recall the qualities of their husband as described in their experimental prompt. Some respondents did not answer these questions correctly. I decided to exclude

these respondents from the final sample because I could not be confident that these participants noticed the experimental manipulations and answered the survey with the vignette in mind. After dropping these respondents, my final sample size was 1,105 with between 149 and 112 participants in each of the nine experimental conditions.

SCREENER, PROMPT, AND MANIPULATIONS

I fielded the survey between January 7, 2017 and February 3, 2017. I used MTurk to advertise the survey and recruit participants and then directed participants to the survey instrument hosted on Qualtrics Survey Platform. I directed potential participants to complete a pre-survey screener to ensure that the sample was restricted to unpartnered, childless women between the ages of 18 and 32 who lived in the United States. The screener contained relevant questions about age, gender, country of residence, number of children, and marital/relationship status. I also included additional demographic questions about race/ethnicity, education level, individual earnings, employment status, and political affiliation to use for subsequent analysis. The screener took less than five minutes to complete, and I paid participants $0.15 for completing the screener regardless of if they qualified for the survey experiment sample pool.

Participants who met the criteria for the sampling frame were then directed to the survey instrument.[19] The experimental vignette asked each participant to imagine that, several years in the future, she was married, had two young children, and worked full time. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions that varied husbands' contributions to childcare along two axes (Figure 3.1). The first axis varied the *amount* of childcare he contributed (low, high, and control conditions). Vignettes directly stated that

[19] The survey questions are included in Appendix 2.

the husband either did or did not assist with childcare-typed tasks. The second axis varied the *quality* of the childcare the he contributed (low, high, and control conditions). Vignettes described either how the participant could or could not rely on her husband to complete childcare tasks.[20]

[Insert Figure 3.1]

After reading the prompt, participants answered survey items that measured their career attitudes given the conditions described in the experiment prompt. Items included preferences for combining work and childcare, their willingness to increase work hours, and the importance of advancing at work. Figure 3.1 lists the exact question wording for each of the scale questions. The survey took less than ten minutes to complete, and I paid participants $0.55 for completing the survey in addition to the $0.15 for completing the screener.

[Insert Figure 3.2]

MEASURES

I used two scales as dependent variables in this analysis. The first is the *career attachment* scale, created from the four questions listed in Figure 3.1. I designed the scale to measure to what degree the women are willing to sacrifice time at home or with family to advance or be a better employee at work. Each of these questions used a seven-point Likert scale with responses ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree". I combined the scores for each of these responses to create the career attachment scale (alpha=.81). The scale ranged from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score of 24, and the mean score was 15.4. The second dependent variable was the *career aspiration*

[20] The base prompt and prompts for each of the nine experimental conditions are included in Appendix 1.

scale which I created from the three questions listed in Figure 3.1 (alpha=.69). I designed this scale to measure how much the women value advancing at work. The questions also used a seven-point Likert scale indicating agreement with the items in the context of the experiment prompt. The scale ranged from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score of 18, and the mean score for the career aspirations scale was 10.4

The models used two primary independent variables derived from the experimental manipulations. *Quality of childcare* described how well the husband provided childcare in the prompt. *Amount of childcare* described how much childcare the husband provided in the prompt. Both variables had three possible values: high, low, and a control condition in which the prompt did not mention the variable

[Insert Table 3.1]

I also collected basic demographic information about participants in the pre-survey screener. Table 3.1 displays means/proportions and ranges for these variables. *Age* is a continuous variable with values ranging from 18 to 32. The average age was 24 and was consistent across the nine experimental conditions. *Race* was created from two questions asking if the person identified as Hispanic or Latino and to select the racial description(s) that best fit their identity. I collapsed responses into four categories: Black/Black Hispanic (13%), White non-Hispanic (63%), Hispanic (19%), and Other[21] (5%). *Individual Income* was a continuous measure of the respondent's own earnings from working. The average for individual income was $42,184. *Education* is a categorical measure of the highest level of education completed. The largest response category was College Degree (37%), followed by High School Degree (28%), Some College (24%), and less than High School Degree (11%). *Employed* is a dummy variable

[21] I included respondents who selected more than one race in the Other category.

indicating if the respondent was currently working for pay. Sixty-seven percent of respondents in the final sample were employed at the time of the survey.

Results

The main analysis consisted of two model sets that looked at the impact of the anticipated amount and quality of husband's contributions to childcare on women's career attitudes. Anticipated career attachment was the dependent variable for the first model set, and anticipated career aspirations was the dependent variable for the second model set. Table 3.2 shows both sets of regression models where the score on the anticipated career attitudes scales was regressed on anticipated amount and quality of the husband's childcare. For both model sets, Model 1 included only amount and quality and Model 2 added an interaction between amount and quality. Amount and quality each had high, low, and control (omitted value) conditions. I start by discussing the results of the first model set using the career attachment scale and then move to the career aspiration scale in the following section.

CAREER ATTACHMENT SCALE

The coefficient for high amount of childcare was significant and positive ($p = 0.011$) in Model 1, indicating that the conditions for high amount were associated with higher scores on the career attachment scale than the control conditions. The coefficient for low amount was negative and marginally significant ($p = 0.087$), suggesting that the low amount prompt was associated with lower scores on the career attachment scale than the control condition. These coefficients provided support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for high quality was significant and positive ($p = 0.029$), but the coefficient

for the low quality condition was not significant and positive (p = 0.906)). This provided partial support for Hypothesis 3: the high quality condition was associated with higher scores on the career attachment scale than the control condition, but the low quality condition did not have a significantly different effect than the control condition.

[Insert Table 3.2]

Model 2 added an interaction between amount and quality. Several of the interaction terms were significant at the p = 0.01 level, indicating that adding the interaction improved the overall model fit. The coefficients for high amount and quality remained significant and positive (p = 0.008 and p = 0.006) and the coefficient increased in magnitude. This increase in magnitude was partially offset by the negative coefficients for the interaction terms. When the interaction effect was added, the negative coefficient for low quality reversed direction and dropped out of significance (p = 0.146). Figure 3.3 illustrates the effects of amount and quality on career attachment. The condition for low amount and low quality was associated with scores on the attachment scale that were below the overall mean. Similarly, the condition for high amount and high quality was associated with scores above the overall attachment scale mean.

[Insert Figure 3.3]

Results differed for the two conditions where amount and quality had mismatched qualifiers. In the low amount and high quality condition, the suggestion that the husband did not contribute to childcare very often, but that the contributions he made were of high quality was still associated with attachment scale scores below the mean. The same was not true for the high amount and low quality condition; women tended to report above average career attachment when they were asked to anticipate a husband who contributed significantly to childcare tasks, but when his contributions were of low quality. This disparity between the effects of two mismatched conditions suggests that expected

amount of husband's contributions to childcare might have a stronger impact on women's anticipated career attachment than quality.

CAREER ASPIRATIONS SCALE

The second model set examined the relationship between the anticipated amount and quality of husband's contributions to childcare and women's career aspirations. As with the previous model set, Model 1 included only anticipated amount and quality and Model 2 added an interaction effect between anticipated amount and quality. The coefficient for low amount was significant ($p = 0.030$), and the coefficient for high amount was marginally significant ($p = 0.059$). Conditions with low anticipated amount were associated with lower scores on the career aspirations scale compared to the control condition, while the conditions with high anticipated amount were associated with higher scores on the career aspirations scale compared to the control condition. This provided support for Hypothesis 2.

Moving to the conditions for quality, the coefficient for low quality was negative and significant, but the coefficient for high quality was not significant. Women tended to score lower on the career aspirations scale when primed with low quality conditions compared to their counterparts in control condition, but women's scores on the career aspirations scale were not significantly affected by the high quality conditions. This provided partial support for Hypothesis 4.

[Insert Figure 3.4]

Figure 3.4 illustrates the effects of anticipated partner support for childcare on career aspirations. The effects for career aspirations are similar to those in the previous model set for career attachment. The high amount and high quality condition was

associated with the highest scores on the career aspiration scale at three-quarters of a point above the scale mean of 10.4 out of a possible 21. The low amount and low quality condition was associated with the lowest scores on the career aspiration scale at almost a full point below the mean. The mixed qualifier conditions were in the middle with the high amount and low quality condition associated with slightly higher scores than the low amount and high quality condition. As with the previous model set looking at career attachment, amount of childcare appeared to have a stronger impact on the career aspiration score than quality.

Model 2 added an interaction between anticipated amount and quality of husband's childcare. The main effects for both amount and quality dropped out of significance with only anticipated low amount remaining marginally significant ($p = 0.060$). None of the interaction effects were significant. This indicated that anticipated amount and quality had separate and independent effects on the career aspirations scale and that the presence of one independent variable did not significantly impact the effect of the other independent variable. Mode 1 provided a better fit for looking at the relationship between career aspirations and anticipated future support for childcare.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

The analyses in Table 3.2 did not include women in the sample who incorrectly answered one or both of the manipulation check questions. Restricting the sample to respondents who correctly answered the manipulation check questions ensured that respondents read the experiment prompt and that they were primed by the manipulated experimental conditions. But excluding this group of respondents could have biased the results of the analysis if the women who failed the manipulation check differed from

those who passed the check and were included in the sample. To check for differences between the two groups, I started by looking at observable differences among the descriptive statistics collected in the survey. Using ANOVAs and t-tests, I did not find differences in education, race, age, or income between the two samples.[22]

Next, I recreated the model sets from the previous section with the full sample. For both models sets, most of the results were similar between models using the full and restricted samples. The coefficients changed slightly in magnitude, but did not change direction or significance level. The only exception was Model 2 in the career aspirations model set that included an interaction between husband's anticipated amount and quality of childcare. All of the interaction terms remained insignificant, but two of the coefficients changed direction. Otherwise, the restricted and full sample models were similar. This difference between results for the full and restricted sample for the second career aspirations model does not have a major effect on the results and interpretations of these analyses, however, because the coefficients are not significant in either model and Model 2 did not offer an improvement in fit over Model 1.

Discussion

Women and men consider how they will combine work and family when thinking about their future romantic relationships and how they would like to structure their family lives (Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). They also make career decisions based upon their day-to-day household responsibilities, their ability to combine their work and family responsibilities successfully, and the support they receive from their romantic partners in managing the potential conflicts between these responsibilities (Blair-Loy

[22] Means and ANOVA results are not shown.

2003; Stone 2007; Williams 2010). I built upon this foundation by looking at the relationship between future expectations of partner support for reproductive labor and women's attitudes toward work. In this analysis, I used data from an original survey experiment to examine the relationship between the anticipated amount and quality of husband's contribution to childcare and women's expectations and attitudes about their careers.

The first set of models regressed women's score on the career attachment scale on the anticipated amount and quality of husband's childcare. Both amount and quality of anticipated partner support increased women's score on the career attachment scale. The effects of anticipated high amount and quality conditions were larger than the effects of the anticipated low amount and quality conditions for the career attachment scale.

This indicates that either the low qualifier conditions do not have a strong effect on career attachment or that women were more likely to anticipate low amount and/or quality childcare from their future partners in the control condition, making their scores on the career attachment scale more similar to those of the women in the low amount and quality conditions. Gerson's (2011) observations about women's doubts about achieving an egalitarian division of labor and preferences for a self-reliant fallback position support the second explanation: women recognize the possibility that their partners will not contribute equally at home.

The second set of models looked at the relationship between career aspiration and anticipated amount and quality of husband's childcare. Anticipated amount and quality of husband's childcare impacted women's scores on the career aspirations scale: the low conditions for both amount and quality decreased women's scores on the career aspirations scale and the high condition for amount increased women's scores on the scale.

This analysis looked at two facets of partner provided childcare: the amount of childcare and the quality of childcare that was provided. This distinction between amount and quality is important because ideas of intensive mothering/parenting and the association of women with ultimate responsibility for children's wellbeing encourages men and women to view and react differently to parenting responsibilities in ways that later impact their careers and earnings potential. It is not enough that children are adequately cared for. Instead, parents must spend time and emotional energy ensuring that their children's lives are enriched to maximize their future wellbeing and opportunities for success (Hays 1998). Though mothers and fathers are equally capable of providing both basic care and intensive parenting, mothers are more frequently blamed when the child experiences problems or someone perceives the child's care to be inadequate. This blame manifests in the form of comments at work about women neglecting their children in favor of their careers (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007) and in day-to-day conversation when people blame and critique the mothers of men who have committed crimes (Hays 1998). Anticipating having a husband who provides enough care only meets the most basic standards; the care also has to be of high quality to fulfill requirements of intensive parenting. This analysis affirms this point; women who were primed by reading about a future scenario where their husband contributed a high amount of childcare but the quality of the childcare did not meet the women's standards reported lower career attachment and aspiration than the control group. Again, the effects of anticipated amount appeared to be slightly stronger than the effects of anticipated quality.

There was an interaction effect between the anticipated amount and quality of partner' childcare contributions and women's scores on the career attachment scale. Amount and quality of childcare have an overlapping and moderating effect on women's

career attachment. Women who were primed with a scenario where their husband contributed a high amount of childcare but whose contributions did not meet the women's standards for childcare scored higher than the mean but not by much. This suggests that an egalitarian division of labor may only be part of a solution to women's greater burden of reproductive labor—couples also need to have and meet similar standards of care.

It is worth noting that while quality of care was significant and that women who were primed with both high amount and quality conditions had the highest scores for both career attitudes scales, amount appears to matter more than quality. In the mixed qualifier conditions for both scales, the high amount and low quality condition was associated with higher scores than the low amount and high quality condition. This analysis confirmed the observations in the literature that quality of men's childcare does affect women's thoughts about their careers. However, these results suggest that although women may have higher standards for childcare, they are willing to sacrifice their standards to invest in their careers.

Women's attitudes about their careers are shaped by their anticipated and actual support for childcare. Future research could expand on this project by examining how men's attitudes about their careers are shaped by their anticipated and/or actual support for childcare. It is also worth considering that women and families receive help caring for their children from sources outside of the nuclear family. It is possible that actual or anticipated support from family members like older female relatives would have a similar impact on women's perceived ability to manage market work while raising young children.

Gerson's (2011) study demonstrates that men and women think about how they will combine work and family responsibilities in their future relationships and recognize

that they may have to adjust their preferences to the realities of an inflexible work culture. The fact that both the anticipated amount of childcare and the quality of the childcare contributed by their partners affected career attachment and future aspirations suggests that there are two components to an egalitarian distribution of household labor between couples. A couple must agree on both standards for caring for children and day-to-day household chores and agree to split the tasks evenly. Efforts to encourage egalitarian divisions of labor must contend with the ideology of intensive mothering that insists mothers should be the primary caretaker of their children as well as the ideal worker norm that discourages men from contributing to childcare and housework by marginalizing anyone who signals divided loyalties.

Table 4.1: Means and Proportions for Scales and Demographic Characteristics

	Mean/Proportion	Minimum	Maximum
Career Attachment Scale	15.4	0	24
Career Aspirations Scale	10.4	0	18
Age	24.3	18	32
Race/Ethnicity			
White	0.63	0	1
Black	0.13	0	1
Other	0.05	0	1
Hispanic	0.19	0	1
Individual Income	$42,184	$0	$250,000
Education			
< High School	0.11	0	1
High School	0.28	0	1
Some College	0.24	0	1
College Degree	0.37	0	1
Employed	0.67	0	1
N		1,105	

Table 4.2: Career Attitudes Regressed on Anticipated Amount and Quality of Childcare

	Career Attachment		Career Aspirations	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
Amount				
(Control)				
Low	-0.468 +	0.181	-0.624 *	-0.675 +
	(0.087)	(0.702)	(0.030)	(0.060)
High	0.695 *	1.873 **	0.390 +	0.458
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.059)	(0.201)
Quality				
(Control)				
Low	0.032	0.687	-0.456 *	-0.464
	(0.906)	(0.146)	(0.027)	(0.195)
High	0.598 *	1.771 **	0.257	0.283
	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.213)	(0.429)
Amount*Quality				
(Control*Control)				
Low*Low		-0.506		-0.006
		(0.448)		(0.991)
Low*High		-1.440 *		0.157
		(0.031)		(0.757)
High*Low		-1.458 *		0.030
		(0.029)		(0.953)
High*High		-2.078 *		-0.235
		(0.020)		(0.643)
Constant	15.08	14.47	10.54	10.53
N	1,294	1,294	1,294	1,294

* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001

P-value in parentheses.

		Quality of Husband's Childcare		
		High Quality	**Low Quality**	**Control (No Quality)**
Amount of Husband's Childcare	**High Amount**	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3
	Low Amount	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
	Control (No Amount)	Condition 7	Condition 8	Condition 9

Figure 4.1: Experimental Conditions

Career Attachment Scale

- I would be willing to work overtime to help my boss in a crunch.
- If I were to have another child, I would want to take off four months or more for work.
- If my child was sick, I would rather my husband be the parent to miss work.
- I would take a promotion that required me to work five more hours each week.

Career Aspiration Scale

- I would be ambitious at work.
- Being promoted at work would be important to me.
- Moving into a higher management or executive position at work would be important to me.

Figure 4.2 Career Attitudes Scale Questions: All questions in both scales used a seven-point Likert scale for response options. Responses ranged from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".



Figure 4.3 Effect of Quantity and Quality on Attachment Scale: The figure shows the distance from the mean score on the career attachment scale (15.4 out of 28) for each of the combinations of low and high amount and low and high quality childcare. I used coefficients from Model 2 that includes an interaction between amount and quality.



Figure 4.4 Effects of Quantity and Quality on Aspiration Scale: The figure shows the distance from the mean score on the career aspiration scale (10.4 out of 21) for each of the combinations of low and high amount and low and high quality childcare. I used coefficients from the uninteracted first model.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

OVERVIEW

In these analyses, I investigated how men's contributions to reproductive labor affect the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium. I focused on female-breadwinner households as a site for examining the distribution of childcare and its impact on earnings because it flips the traditional archetype of the breadwinner husband and homemaking wife. In this chapter, I start by providing an overview of the analyses in the previous three chapters with a focus on the key findings as well as practical and theoretical implications. I then conclude the chapter by talking about some limitations of these analysis and directions for future research on reproductive labor and the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium.

In chapter two, I examined the differences between the division of household labor in female-breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households. I used data from the 2008 SIPP to compare the husband's likelihood of reducing his labor force participation to care for children and the husband's involvement in childcare in the two categories of households over a five year period. I used coarsened exact matching to address potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to husband's contributions. I matched female-breadwinner households and non-female-breadwinner households on wife's education, race, occupation, and job tenure as well as the couple's number of children age 10 to 17, number of children under age 10, and geographic region of residence. I expected that husbands in female-breadwinner households would have a higher likelihood of reducing their labor force participation for childcare and have higher levels of involvement with their children than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and

equal earner households. I found that husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare. Husbands in managerial and technical occupations, which are more likely to offer flexibility benefits, were more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare than husbands in other occupations. Husbands in female-breadwinner households also had higher levels of involvement in childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. However, the effects sizes were small, so the practical difference between the two groups was less than half a point on an 18-point scale despite the high level of statistical significance. Husbands who had reduced their labor force participation for childcare subsequently had higher levels of childcare involvement even after they returned to work compared to husbands who had never worked part time or not worked for a period of time specifically to care for children. Because the differences in involvement between female-breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households were small it is unlikely that breadwinning wives will be able to reduce their domestic labor enough to capture the same breadwinning premium that fathers see, even in cases where husbands perform more reproductive labor.

These analyses suggest that husbands' likelihood of reducing their labor force participation for childcare was limited by ability: husbands were more likely to have worked part time or not worked to care for children at some point in the past when they were not the primary earner in the household and when they worked in occupations that were more likely to offer flexibility benefits. Having modified their labor force participation for childcare in the past increased husbands involvement with children and had the potential to impact the household distribution of labor even when they returned to full-time work. My analysis supports the idea that structural constraints at work hinder an egalitarian distribution of labor at home.

In the third chapter, I investigated whether the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium in earnings are always gendered by looking at the case of female-breadwinner households to find cases where mothers escape the penalty and even achieve a breadwinner premium. I used the 2008 SIPP to examine if providing childcare impacted husbands' earnings and how receiving support for childcare from their husbands impacted wives' earnings over a period of five years. I used CEM to match female-breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households on wife's education, race, occupation, and job tenure as well as the couple's number of children age 10 to 17 and number of children under age 10 and geographic region of residence. I wanted to test if the effects of providing or receiving support for childcare on earnings differed between female-breadwinner households and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households. Initially, the breadwinner effect appeared not to be gendered: wives in female-breadwinner households saw larger increases in earnings over time than their counterparts in male-breadwinner/equal-earner households and men in female-breadwinner households saw smaller increases in earnings over time than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. However, breadwinning wives still earned less than breadwinning/equal-earning husbands even after controlling for human capital and demographic characteristics. These discrepancies are likely conservative because I combined both breadwinning and equal earning husbands into a single group which I then compared to breadwinning wives. Women did experience a breadwinner premium, but it was lower in magnitude (both in dollars and in percent increase) than the premium experienced by men. The premium was gendered, but both men and women experienced a penalty for caregiving.

In chapter four, I used an original survey experiment to look at how anticipated partner support for childcare impacted women's career attitudes. In the previous two

chapters, I used coarsened exact matching and fixed effects to provide the strongest causal argument possible, but the possibility of self-selection into female-breadwinner households remained. I designed the survey experiment to further examine the link between men's caregiving and women's careers.

Research on the gender pay gap in general and the motherhood penalty specifically points to an egalitarian distribution of labor in the home as necessary to achieving gender parity in earnings and career outcomes. I focused on two components of household labor: amount of labor performed and the quality of contributions. The experimental prompt described a future scenario where the women were married, had children, and both partners worked. I manipulated how much childcare the husband performed and the quality of his childcare contributions. Manipulations for both amount and quality of anticipated childcare support affected women's career attitudes. Women who read about receiving more support or higher quality support from their future partners reported higher levels of career attachment and career aspirations than women who read about receiving less support or lower quality support. The effect was strongest when women read about receiving both high amounts of support and high quality support. The analysis confirmed my hypotheses that both quality and quality of anticipated partner contributions to childcare would impact women's career attitudes. The effects of the low amount and quality conditions were also weaker than the effects of the high amount and quality conditions. There are two possible explanations: either the low qualifier conditions have a weak effect on career attachment or women tended to anticipate low amount and/or quality childcare from their future partners in the control condition, making their scores on the career attachment scale more similar to those of the women in the low amount and quality conditions.

The results of the survey experiment suggest that there are at least two significant components to an egalitarian distribution of labor: partners must both contribute similar amounts of work and they must also come to an agreement on how tasks should be completed and meet these shared standards in their contributions. One partner's standards for childcare or housework are not necessarily superior or more correct, but the disparity in standards and in the quality of contributions has the potential to negatively impact the partner with the higher standards. Furthermore, expectations for a non-egalitarian distribution of housework and childcare has the potential to negatively impact women even before they form intimate partnerships and have children.

STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK

This project combined empirical analysis of an existing nationally representative survey with analysis of results from an original survey experiment. The focus on female-breadwinner households in two of the analyses is one of the major contributions of this dissertation because it demonstrates that the circumstances of an individual relationship are not enough to overcome the structural barriers to an egalitarian distribution of labor in the household or gender parity in earnings. I also complicate the idea of an egalitarian distribution of household labor in the survey experiment by separating quantity and quality of child care performed. An egalitarian distribution of labor at home is also hindered by gendered ideas about parenting and responsibility for the home that result in men and women having different expectations for what it means to be a good mother or father. This research contributes to the argument that the gender pay gap is not the result of individual choice, it is supported and maintained by institutional constraints and gendered expectations of motherhood and fatherhood.

These analyses have limitations that are important to note. The analyses that used data from the 2008 SIPP only considered the impacts of men's childcare on earnings and the differences in husband's childcare between female-breadwinner and non-female breadwinner households. The absence of information about wives contributions to childcare in the dataset means that I could not consider how husband's involvement in childcare impacted wives' involvement in childcare. Maume (2008) suggests that husbands are more likely to contribute childcare on weekends than they are during or after a workday. It is possible that, although husbands in male-breadwinner household, who are in more flexible occupations, or who have reduced their labor force participation at some point in the past are contributing more than their counterparts, but I cannot show whether or not this lessens the childcare burden for wives. Female-breadwinner households are a growing population and there is a growing interest in men's parenting in quantitative research, so it is likely that datasets in the next decade will allow for more comprehensive analyses of childcare in female-breadwinner households.

Another avenue for future research would be to look at how future expectations for household division of labor and partner support impact pre- and early-career choices. Gerson (2011) demonstrates that men and women both prefer gender-egalitarian family formations, but are skeptical that they will be able to actualize their preferences in their future relationships. Pedulla and Thébaud (2015) further demonstrate that these preferences are impacted by structural constraints in the workplace. My survey experiment analysis suggests that expectations about future family formations have the potential to impact career attitudes in young adulthood before people marry and have children. My results are limited in their generalizability because I only sampled women. The findings of these three studies are compelling, but are limited because they ask about expected or anticipated behavior. The argument that expectations about division of labor

in future relationships and ability to combine work and family influence behavior would be strengthened by analysis of longitudinal data that links past expectations and attitudes with future career outcomes.

A final avenue for future research would be to expand the scope of this sample to include other subpopulations. I took inspiration from Mignon Moore's (2011) analysis of parenting in black lesbian couples in which she uses observations of a very particular group of women to advance our understanding of how couples negotiate parenting responsibility. Female-breadwinner households provided an interesting case in my analysis because they break from the traditionally defined household responsibilities for men and women. Subgroups like female-breadwinner households are not necessarily representative of the population, but they provide a case where we can test if, under specific circumstances, gender inequalities in childcare, earnings, or other areas can be reduced or eliminated. Cohabiting couples with children provide another interesting subpopulation for studying the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium as well as gender disparities in childcare. I excluded cohabiting couples from the 2008 SIPP analysis sample data and the survey experiment instructed respondents to imagine a future in which they were married. We know that there are differences between couples in married and cohabiting relationships on factors like union length and relationship quality (Jose, O'Leary, and Moyer 2010), demographic makeup of both groups including differences in race, class, and educational background (Goodwin, Mosher, and Chandra 2010), and investment in the relationship (Poortman and Mills, 2012). Cohabiting couples provide an interesting opportunity to test the impacts of investment in intimate relationships and expectations of union duration on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium and gendered division of childcare. Future research should continue to look for instances where the gender pay gap and gendered division of household labor

could be reduced or eliminated to increase our understanding of both the structural and social contributors to gender inequality.

Appendix 1: Experimental Prompt

[Description of Manipulations: The prompt was divided into three sections. Section One was presented to all participants. Section Two contained the amount manipulation. The high amount condition was included the first set of words within the parentheses, and the low amount condition was included the second set of words within the parentheses. The amount control conditions excluded this section. Section Three contained the quality manipulations. The "But" transition in parentheses was included in the high amount/low quality and the low amount/high quality conditions. Similar to Section Two, in Section Three the high quality condition was included the first set of words within the parentheses and the low quality condition was included the second set of words within the parentheses. The quality control conditions excluded this section.]

[PROMPT TEMPLATE]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. [Section Two: Amount Manipulation] Your husband (does most of the/does very little) childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can (always/rarely) count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. [Section Three: Quality Manipulation] (But) When he takes care of the kids, you think that he (does/does not do) a good job: he (keeps track

of/sometimes forgets) play dates, (makes sure homework gets finished/doesn't always remember to check homework), and (knows/doesn't know) what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 1: HIGH AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets finished, and knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 2: HIGH AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the

children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. But when he takes care of the kids, you think that he does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn't always remember to check homework, and doesn't know what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 3: HIGH AMOUNT, NO QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines.

[CONDITION4: LOW AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities

for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. But when he takes care of the kids, you think that he does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets finished, and knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 5: LOW AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn't always remember to check homework, and doesn't know what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 6: LOW AMOUNT, NO QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines.

[CONDITION 7: NO AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets finished, and knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 8: NO AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time

middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn't always remember to check homework, and doesn't know what to do when one of the kids gets sick.

[CONDITION 9: NO AMOUNT, NO QUALITY]

We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.

Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the children when they are not in school.

Appendix 2: Survey Instrument

Given the scenario that you just read about, please answer the following questions about your attitudes toward work. Please answer as if you were in the situation you just read about. [Answer choices for Q1-4: Likert scale from 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 7 "Strongly Agree.]

1. I would be willing to work overtime to help my boss in a crunch.
2. If I were to have another child, I would want to take off 4 months or more from work.
3. If my child was sick, I would rather my husband be the parent to miss work.
4. I would take a promotion that required me to work 5 additional hours each week.

5. If you were in the scenario you just read about, how many hours a week would you ideally like to work? [Answer choice for Q5: enter a number of hours ranging from 0-168]

Thinking back to the scenario you just read about, please answer these questions about your attitudes toward work. Again, please answer as if you were in the situation you just read about. [Answer choices for Q6-9: Likert scale from 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 7 "Strongly Agree"]

6. I would be ambitious at work.

7. Being promoted at work would be important to me.
8. Moving into a higher management or executive position at work would be important to me.
9. I would be very dissatisfied with my job as whole.

10. Now we would like to ask you about stress. Stress means a situation in which a person feels tense, restless, nervous or anxious or is unable to sleep at night because his/her mind is troubled all the time. Thinking back to the situation described in the scenario, how much stress do you think you would feel? [Answer choices for Q10: Likert scale from 1 "None" to 7 "A Great Deal"]

Now we would like to ask about how you would divide your time in the scenario you just read. Please move the slider to indicate how you think you would divide your time. [Answer choices for Q11-12: slider with a 100-point scale with 0 indicating "All time spent on work" and 100 indicating "All time spent on childcare"]

11. Considering the situation described in the prompt, how do you think you would divide your time between childcare and work?
12. If you had complete control over your schedule, how would you like to divide your time between childcare and work?

13. Thinking back to the scenario you read about, how much help did your husband provide in terms of childcare? (1 "Husband does not do any childcare", 2" Husband does less childcare than you do", 3 "You and your

husband evenly split the childcare", 4 "Husband Does more childcare than you do", 5 "Husband does most of the childcare")

14. Thinking back to the scenario you read about, rate the quality of the childcare your husband provided. (1 "Poor", 2 "Fair", 3 "Good", 4 "Very Good", 5 "Excellent")

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